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ABSTRACT
Martyrs have long been lauded as effective tools of mass persuasion. Once firmly
identified with a variety of religious faiths, the martyr has just recently emerged within
the secular world of politics and, in particular, within states embroiled in revolution. This
thesis is a descriptive and analytical exercise which researches a number of areas
concerning revolutionary martyrs First, it examines the evolution of the martyr's
character throughout its history. Next, it determines both the necessary and sufficient
conditions which are present in the creation of martyrs in revolution. Third, the study
suggests that some revolutionary martyrs possess a greater potential to arouse an incipient,
latent community to support revolutionary movements Finally, it offers a measurement
scale to determine the effectiveness of a revolutionary's martyrdom to incite action and
identifies those bureaucratic controls which may enhance and politicize the image within
a population in turmoil. In so doing, it is the author's hope that this research can be
fruitful to policy makers and operators within the Departments of State and Defense in
their on going efforts to more clearly understand and effectively employ psychological
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Persuasion has long been lauded as an essential tool to induce communities to adopt
a specific behavior. In non-hostile, economically competitive environments, such as the
commercial marketing field, persuasion manifests itself in mass advertising campaigns to
convince potential purchasers to buy a particular product. The most successful of these
marketing strategies involve sensational, glitzy campaigns to attract notice. As evidence,
look no further than today's tabloid magazines and television shows that report lurid
stories concerning the sexual deviancy of a popular music star or the suicide of a young
actor. As the hype concerning these reports build, circulation rates increase and viewer
ratings soar. Sensationalism sells no matter what the environment. In hostile, socio-
politically competitive environments, such as states embroiled in revolution, persuasive
efforts focus instead on inducing the population to either support or reject contending
parties in the conflict. Typically, revolutionary "markets" become rife with their own all
too familiar advertising campaigns and are characterized by the use of familiar cultural
settings, catchy slogans, and powerful symbols. As with any advertising campaign, the
more sensational and spectacular the theme, the greater the chance for revolutionaries to
influence the behavior of their target audience. Among revolutionary movements
throughout the course of history and spanning ethnically and culturally drawn borders, one
particular sensational propaganda technique figures prominently - the use of martyr
images.
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Crucifixions, stake burnings, tortuous death by dismemberment, being eaten alive by
jungle beasts - What can cause a greater sensation than the violent, grisly death of a
human being? Of all the historical symbols of propaganda, the martyr has been the most
sensational and effective psychological weapons of mass persuasion known to man.
Embraced by diverse secular ideologies across the continuum of the political spectrum,
as well as by a multitude of religious sects, the martyr's appeal has seemingly had a
universal reach. In fact, nearly every revolution in modern times has been defined by
either its archetypical martyr or by a pantheon of fallen "saviors." Unfortunately, these
symbols of political and religious violence have remained fully within the realm of
sensationalism, with vast literary attention being devoted to adulating biographies or
scathing denunciations of their images They have, in fact, garnered little scholarly
attention, nor have they been subjected to the rigors of analytical research. This thesis,
therefore, attempts to correct these previous academic oversights.
The purpose of this study is to explore the phenomenon of martyrdom within the
context of revolution. The pages that follow are animated by three research questions -
1) What is the essence of the martyr's character and why has it been embraced by
disparate movements throughout history 9 2) How and under what conditions are martyrs
created? And finally, 3) Do some martyrs possess a greater potential to incite action and
if so how might revolutionary groups use these images to further their edicts upon
society? By addressing these questions this thesis is meant to be both a descriptive and
an analytical exercise which formulates a string of hypotheses related to martyrs as tools
of psychological operations. My hypotheses are:
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1) Martyrs have increasingly become political and militant figures. This change of
character can be clearly traced throughout the course of history from early religious
movements to more modern secular ideologies.
2) The martyr is not self-made. He is a product of his society and his creation is
conditionally dependent upon the nature of his social environment, as well as a
number of necessary and sufficient catalysts.
3) Although martyrs carry inherent powers of sensational attraction, their persuasive
effectiveness is relative and measurable. Each revolutionary martyr's symbolic
power is dependent upon the transformation of his image into one of a paradigmatic
truth,
]
with some revolutionary martyrs carrying greater effective power than others.
Once created the ultimate success of the martyr depends upon bureaucratic strategies
which determine the orientation pattern - passive or active - of the symbol.
The definitive goal throughout the course of this thesis is to develop an analytical
framework to assess the martyr's effectiveness in mobilizing and radicalizing an incipient,
latent community to adopt the cause of revolution. In so doing, it is my hope that this
research will be fruitful to policy makers and operators within the United States
Departments of Defense and State in their on going efforts to more clearly understand and
xMany sociologists refer to this process as myth-building. Myths, however, are value
laden terms carrying with them an inherent bias. Those which believe the myth are
"uninformed," "naive," or "uneducated." Those which do not believe in the myth or often
regarded as adhering to another unabashed truth. For the purpose of this study, I will use the
term paradigmatic truth, borrowed from sociologist and author Bruce Lincoln. This term
refers to a social charter which communities use as a template for defining the authority of
truth. See Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of
Myth, Ritual, and Classification , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 24.
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effectively employ psychological operations in revolutionary conflicts around the globe.
The design of this thesis first took shape by canvassing existing theories concerning
political conflict, religious violence, and political symbolism. Clearly, no one theory
among this list, whether structural, systems or actor - oriented, is sufficiently able to
explain the impact martyrs have had upon their societies. This is due to an overwhelming
academic reliance to empirically measure indicators associated with conflicts. The
abstract image of the martyr does not lend itself to such measurement and thus remains
largely a foreign entity to these models Instead, it is necessary to look beyond these
theories toward other social science disciplines to accommodate for the image of the
martyr. These disciplines - sociology, anthropology, theology, and psychology - provide
additional theoretical insight into the immaterial causes of violence and social conflict and
allow for the formulation of more robust and inclusive models. What follows in this
study, therefore, is a liberal synthesis of competitive theories that covers an expanse of
disciplines in order to account for and explain the martyr and its place within revolution.
This thesis is organized into five chapters The following chapter traces the martyr
throughout history in order to more clearly highlight its evolutionary change of character
as a tool of political violence and political agitation The core of Chapter III involves a
the development of a structural theory toward the creation of the martyr within his social
environment. In this chapter a model is used to portray key social conditions, critical
events, and catalytic factors which contribute to the creation of martyrs and help to
distinguish them above heroes and patriots of revolutionary movements. Chapter IV
presents yet another model which helps track the amplification of the martyr image and
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its effectiveness along three dimensions - truth perception, credibility and legitimate
authority. By offering cases to illustrate this model, I demonstrate how some martyrs may
achieve greater success at persuading their communities than others. I also identify and
explain those bureaucratic controls necessary for the revolutionary movements to fully
"sell" and capitalize on the potential influence a martyr has upon a community. Finally,
in Chapter V I summarize my arguments based upon the previously stated analyses in the
body of the work and I will offer suggestions for additional study on the role of martyrs
in the future
Can symbols sustain revolutionary struggles7 Of course. As has been evidenced
within numerous revolutions, societies in turmoil have thrived on the ritual and pomp
created within an aura of political symbols To the extent that certain symbols remain
inherently more powerful than others, however, remains the gist of this thesis. Martyrs
are the preeminent symbols of militant political propaganda. And some martyrs more
than others continue to entrance and incite their communities for thousands of years. If
we can uncover the potential power that each martyr holds for its community, we can
attempt to either exploit it or determine a strategy to attack its symbolic effect. In so




Persuasion has long been lauded as an essential tool to induce communities to adopt
a specific behavior. In non-hostile, economically competitive environments, such as the
commercial marketing field, persuasion manifests itself in mass advertising campaigns to
convince potential purchasers to buy a particular product The most successful of these
marketing strategies involve sensational, glitzy campaigns to attract notice. As evidence,
look no further than today's tabloid magazines and television shows that report lurid
stories concerning the sexual deviancy of a popular music star or the suicide of a young
actor. As the hype concerning these reports build, circulation rates increase and viewer
ratings soar. Sensationalism sells no matter what the environment. In hostile, socio-
politically competitive environments, such as states embroiled in revolution, persuasive
efforts focus instead on inducing the population to either support or reject contending
parties in the conflict. Typically, revolutionary "markets" become rife with their own all
too familiar advertising campaigns and are characterized by the use of familiar cultural
settings, catchy slogans, and powerful symbols As with any advertising campaign, the
more sensational and spectacular the theme, the greater the chance for revolutionaries to
influence the behavior of their target audience. Among revolutionary movements
throughout the course of history and spanning ethnically and culturally drawn borders, one
particular sensational propaganda technique figures prominently - the use of martyr
images.
Crucifixions, stake burnings, tortuous death by dismemberment, being eaten alive by
jungle beasts - What can cause a greater sensation than the violent, grisly death of a
human being? Of all the historical symbols of propaganda, the martyr has been the most
sensational and effective psychological weapons of mass persuasion known to man.
Embraced by diverse secular ideologies across the continuum of the political spectrum,
as well as by a multitude of religious sects, the martyr's appeal has seemingly had a
universal reach. In fact, nearly every revolution in modern times has been defined by
either its archetypical martyr or by a pantheon of fallen "saviors." Unfortunately, these
symbols of political and religious violence have remained fully within the realm of
sensationalism, with vast literary attention being devoted to adulating biographies or
scathing denunciations of their images. They have, in fact, garnered little scholarly
attention, nor have they been subjected to the rigors of analytical research. This thesis,
therefore, attempts to correct these previous academic oversights.
A. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this study is to explore the phenomenon of martyrdom within the
context of revolution. The pages that follow are animated by three research questions -
1) What is the essence of the martyr's character and why has it been embraced by
disparate movements throughout history? 2) How and under what conditions are martyrs
created? And finally, 3) Do some martyrs possess a greater potential to incite action and
if so how might revolutionary groups use these images to further their edicts upon
society? By addressing these questions this thesis is meant to be both a descriptive and
an analytical exercise which formulates a string of hypotheses related to martyrs as tools
of psychological operations. My hypotheses are:
1) Martyrs have increasingly become political and militant figures. This change of
character can be clearly traced throughout the course of history from early religious
movements to more modern secular ideologies.
2) The martyr is not self-made. He is a product of his society and his creation is
conditionally dependent upon the nature of his social environment, as well as a
number of necessary and sufficient catalysts.
3) Although martyrs carry inherent powers of sensational attraction, their persuasive
effectiveness is relative and measurable. Each revolutionary martyr's symbolic
power is dependent upon the transformation of his image into one of a paradigmatic
truth, with some revolutionary martyrs carrying greater effective power than others.
Once created the ultimate success of the martyr depends upon bureaucratic strategies
which determine the orientation pattern - passive or active - of the symbol.
The definitive goal throughout the course of this thesis is to develop an analytical
framework to assess the martyr's effectiveness in mobilizing and radicalizing an incipient,
latent community to adopt the cause of revolution. In so doing, it is my hope that this
:Many sociologists refer to this process as myth-building Myths, however, are value
laden terms carrying with them an inherent bias. Those which believe the myth are
"uninformed," "naive," or "uneducated." Those which do not believe in the myth or often
regarded as adhering to another unabashed truth. For the purpose of this study, I will use the
term paradigmatic truth, borrowed from sociologist and author Bruce Lincoln. This term
refers to a social charter which communities use as a template for defining the authority of
truth. See Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of
Myth. Ritual, and Classification
.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 24.
research will be fruitful to policy makers and operators within the United States
Departments of Defense and State in their on going efforts to more clearly understand and
effectively employ psychological operations in revolutionary conflicts around the globe.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The design of this thesis first took shape by canvassing existing theories concerning
political conflict, religious violence, and political symbolism. Clearly, no one theory
among this list, whether structural, systems or actor - oriented, is sufficiently able to
explain the impact martyrs have had upon their societies. This is due to an overwhelming
academic reliance to empirically measure indicators associated with conflicts. The
abstract image of the martyr does not lend itself to such measurement and thus remains
largely a foreign entity to these models. Instead, it is necessary to look beyond these
theories toward other social science disciplines to accommodate for the image of the
martyr. These disciplines - sociology, anthropology, theology, and psychology - provide
additional theoretical insight into the immaterial causes of violence and social conflict and
allow for the formulation of more robust and inclusive models. What follows in this
study, therefore, is a liberal synthesis of competitive theories that covers an expanse of
disciplines in order to account for and explain the martyr and its place within revolution.
This resulting design dictated the auspices for the research methodology concerning
the subject at hand. Most analyses rely solely upon either a limited number of case
studies - often two or three - or the lengthy compilation of data bases to provide the
scholarly methodological structure to social scientific research. Neither of these methods
alone serves justice to this study. The latter approach, the data base, is firmly rooted to
empirical, objective studies. Clearly, the data base may be used to illustrate ideal, typical
"profiles" of the research subject. In this case, martyrs may be examined using a number
of criteria (age at death, education level, marital status, etc ). This method does little to
measure the effect an abstract image has upon an audience. The former approach of
limited case studies also research misgivings. While the case study approach enables a
selectively controlled sample, it does so at the cost of ignoring a multitude of exemplary
martyrs in revolution.
Thus, the most appropriate methodology for this study is to enjoin both popular
research methods. I will therefore conduct a controlled comparative analysis, using a
variety of historical cases, but I will also establish an austere data base to develop an
ideal martyr profile. Analytical control measures designed to reduce the sample of the
martyr population eligible involve three restrictive criteria First, only those martyrs
created from within regime replacement and communal revolutions2 will be among those
used in the sample. Second, only paradigmatic martyrs - those which are singled out
(whether by the revolutionary organization or by any other audience) above others as the
prominent or leading images of each particular struggle - were the subjects for this
Characterized by Chalmers Johnson, these revolutions include those attempts to enact
social change, involving as their means the intrusion of extreme forms of violence into
normally civil-social relations. The "Simple" or "Regime Replacement Revolutions"achieve
their ends by merely replacing a regime, such as the American Revolution, which replaced the
parliamentary monarchy with democratic rule The "Complex," "Total, " or "Communal
Revolutions" seek to replace the entire social structure of a state. Such was the case during
the French and Russian Revolutions. See Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change ,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 1-15 and pp 122-135.
analytical research. Third, this study only analyzes those martyrs that actually died during
their struggles with an authoritative regime. This eliminates a multitude of proclaimed
martyrs that suffered through imprisonment or persecution. 3
Next, I will apply multi-variable reduction techniques using the adaptation of various
theories, to identify distinctive qualities and common parallels between martyrs within the
research sample. Using this deductive approach, the construct for analytical models is
simplified. Common themes within this thesis could then be explained by using the most
illustrative examples from within the sample martyr population. The resulting study is
hopefully more well rounded, less confined, and remains as the most interesting approach
to this topic.
C. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The following chapter traces the martyr
throughout history in order to more clearly highlight its evolutionary change of character
as a tool of political violence and political agitation. The core of Chapter III involves a
the development of a structural theory toward the creation of the martyr within his social
environment. In this chapter a model is used to portray key social conditions, critical
events, and catalytic factors which contribute to the creation of martyrs and help to
distinguish them above heroes and patriots of revolutionary movements. Chapter IV
presents yet another model which helps track the amplification of the martyr image and
its effectiveness along three dimensions - truth perception, credibility and legitimate
3For a list of martyrs used as the analytical sample, see Appendix A.
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authority. By offering cases to illustrate this model, I demonstrate how some martyrs may
achieve greater success at persuading their communities than others I also identify and
explain those bureaucratic controls necessary for the revolutionary movements to fully
"sell" and capitalize on the potential influence a martyr has upon a community. Finally,
in Chapter V I will summarize my arguments based upon the previously stated analyses
in the body of the work and I will offer suggestions for additional study on the role of
martyrs in the future.
D. A NOTE ON SOURCES
As has been evidenced throughout the course of the last three centuries, it is a rare
event when revolutions succeed The majority of revolutionary attempts are, in fact, utter
failures. The glaring tendency of regimes who finally do win out over their contentious
pretenders is to strike their influence from the annals of social consciousness. What
therefore transpires is the loss of first hand sources from those organizational "directors"
responsible for propagating martyr images. One such glaring example to this dilemma
is the destruction or loss of the early diaries of the world's most infamous propagandist,
Dr. Josef Goebbels. The vast proportion of material available for researching martyrs in
revolution is therefore contained in secondary sources Whenever possible, however,
recent primary sources were consulted These included organizational manifestos,
journalistic interviews, and a multitude of published speeches and diaries. Although
plagued with propagandist overtones, these sources did enable me to trace first hand
accounts of how revolutionaries viewed martyrdom Having full and prior knowledge of
their prejudiced views made me also more sensitive to assessing martyrs in an objective
light.
II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE MARTYR
Comparing martyrs as a collective body is problematic. A preliminary examination
of their characteristic nature reveals that martyrs are, in fact, incompatible symbols. As
Max Weber wrote, there exists a traditional family of martyrs who willingly accept
persecution and torture as a means to demonstrate their faith, labelled as passive ascetics. 1
Typically associated with religion, these martyrs have come to symbolize an unrelenting
faith in a divine being and predestined course for humanity It is from this religious
backdrop that the earliest martyrs appeared. On the other hand, we know that there exists
another body of martyrs far different from those of their withdrawn cousins. This
subsequent body of martyrs embraced more worldly beliefs - that man can and should
influence his own destiny Primarily militant and political, these martyrs have most
notably been associated with a gamut of secular ideologies including fascism,
communism, and liberal democracy They demonstrate their faith through action and they
adopt violence in order to change their own individual course and the course of their
community. It is only through this violence that they are in turn persecuted, tortured or
killed.
This predominant martyr typology begs further analysis. First, we know that not all
religious martyrs were ascetics. The rabbinical figure Akiba ben Josef, Roman Catholic
Saint Joan of Arc and Shi'ite Imam Husayn, all driven by their religious convictions, led
xMax Weber, The Sociology of Religion , trans Ephraim Fischoff, (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1964), pp. 227-229.
their congregations into battle against blaspheming oppressors. We also know that not
all political martyrs adopt violence. Prominent pacifist martyrs such as Martin Luther
King, Jr. and Mahatma Ghandi opposed all forms of violence during their political efforts
to persuade authorities. Finally, contemporary studies involving revolution show that
social upheaval is rarely defined by purely secular or religious schisms. More often
revolution occurs when political and religious grievances are coterminous and
multiplicative.
2
Thus, it follows that the revolutionary martyr would acquire both political
and religious significance.
This chapter attempts to revise the current typology by offering a more complete
description and analysis of martyrs since their inception. It suggests that martyrs share
other more important commonalities than their titular honor or subjection to persecution
suggests. These common bonds tie martyrs throughout more than two millennia to broad
processes of social change, including revolutions While this study is devoted to martyrs
in revolution, it would be foolhardy to divorce them from their historical antecedents and
those which may succeed them. Revolutionary martyrs are merely a piece of a continuum
of man's struggle to assert his beliefs within oppressive settings. Therefore, it is the aim
of this chapter to examine and trace how the revolutionary martyr evolved from a passive
ascetic to a political militant.
2 See Bruce Lincoln's Introduction to Religion, Rebellion, and Revolution: An
interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collection of essays , ed. Bruce Lincoln, (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1985), pp 3-1 1. In it he provides an overview of the impact of religious
thought from the French Revolution of 1789 to the 1978 Iranian Revolution.
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In so doing, it is my goal to examine both distinguishing and common characteristics
of martyrs along a thematic, if not time-sensitive path. This analysis will cover four
historical phases: religious unitarian movements, religious sectarian and communal
movements, secular ideologies, and reactionary and fundamentalist movements. I will
then portray this evolution using a descriptive model in an attempt to offer a visual
depiction of the martyr and its defining attributes within each phase Finally, I will offer
some tentative predictions concerning the use of martyrs by contending groups in the
future.
A. THE UNITARIAN FAITHS
Sociologists generally accept that the concept of martyrdom developed from an
amalgam of religious ideologies. Among them, noted sociologist and author, Mircea
Eliade posits:
The religions of Egypt and Mesopotamia and Greek philosophy treat ideologies as
distinct cultural realities already hosting the seeds of the ideas of active good and evil
and heroism. Zoroastnan dualism proposed an independent evil force, and Judaism of
the Meccabean age adapted this view of a struggle with evil for monotheism
Hellenism [in turn] brought a personalistic element to the ideologies in the image of
the ascetic philosopher [or prophet] 3
Thus, many conclude that martyrs are a rather recent ideological phenomenon dating not
farther back than the fourth century BCE 4 to the time of the Ancient Macedonian Empire
under Alexander the Great. In fact, the word martyr is derived from the Greek martyr,
3Mircea Eliade, et al, The Encyclopedia of Religion . (New York: MacMillen




meaning "witness." 5 But it is within the Judaic faith that the earliest recorded martyrs
appeared.
The creation of the martyr image is rooted in the era of the Second Temple, when
Ezra rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem, affirmed to deny cultic movements, and pressed for
further legal reforms.
6 Jews by that time had virtually completed their efforts to reunify
their constituency, yet they remained as subjects under the domain of another authority.
These authorities, first the Macedonians and then the Seleucids, had their own legal codes
and expected the Jews to honor them. Bound by Mosaic and Davidic laws the Jews were
destined for another cycle of religious persecution. It was during this time, that Jews
began to adorn multitudes of their persecuted brethren with a sacrosanct homage. H. H.
Ben- Sasson notes:
Martyrdom, the hallowing of God's Name, held a central position in their thought, and
praises were sung of the martyrs. [They - the pious ones] spoke of their longing for
martyrdom, recording the disappointment of a man who wished to hallow the Name
but was never privileged to do so and reckoning how much smaller his portion would
be than that of his comrades who did hallow the Name, for he died in bed while the
others were the 'leaders of the slain.'
7
Thus, Jews were not only taught of the necessity to reject Hellenic temptations and
influences contrary to the laws of Moses and David, but it became a privilege and honor
5
Ibid, p. 230.
This date was confirmed by a number of Jewish theological sources as well as
historical sources including: The Jewish Encyclopedia, ed. Isidore Singer, et al, (New York:
Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1906), pp. 353-356, A History of the Jewish People , ed. H.H.
Ben-Sasson, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 550-553, and An Encyclopedia
of World History: Ancient. Medieval, and Modern , ed. William J. Langer, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1980), 5th edition, p. 46.
Ben-Sasson, p. 553.
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to willingly submit and die in the name of Jehovah when their rulers forced them to
choose between Mosaic and Greek laws. In return for their suffering their names would
be forever remembered as part of the kedoshim, or holy honor roll. Secondly, Jews
believed that Jehovah might be favorably disposed to intercede upon the oppressed Jewish
community's behalf if their martyrs' sacrifices were sufficiently deserving of such action.
Early Christendom follows much the same pattern as this initial Judaic pattern. It also
provides a host of martyrs for examination, beginning with its prototypical paradigm, the
Son of God - Jesus Christ. Crucified at Golgotha, Christ's martyrdom was similar to
those of the early Jewish martyrs - ascetic and passive - in that it centered upon His
selfless sacrifice of life. But in one important way it paved a different path. Not only
would subsequent Christian martyrs' names be hallowed, but they would be exempt from
final judgment and promised eternal life after death 8 Thus, the willingness to submit to
persecution and torture became even more attractive to early Christians than it had been
for the Jews in the fourth and third centuries BCE. To die as Christ died was not only a
desired end but it was an actively pursued goal Subsequent Christian history is replete
with such examples. First, Christ's disciples willingly proselytized His gospel even as
Roman authorities continued to dole out equally appalling brutalities against those who
spoke about His prophesies 9 The disciples, in turn, were followed by their appointed
8Ehade, p. 230.
9The New Testament provides a description of the spectacular deaths and martyrdom
of Christ's disciples Among them John the Baptist was beheaded by King Herod of Judea to
gain the affection of his brother Phillip's wife, Herodias. The Apostle James was also slain
by Herod, this time by the sword. The Apostle Paul, once granted clemency by Caesar, was
subsequently killed during the Roman persecutions of the Christians, sometime after 60 CE.
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apostolic "witnesses" who pursued similar paths and who died in equally spectacular
fashion. 10 A cyclical and generational pattern of faithful Christians who sought sacrificial
redemption ensued up to the third century CE as Christians voluntarily gave their lives
in the infamous carnage undertaken at the Roman Circuses."
The last monotheistic religion, Islam, also embraced martyrdom in its initial phase.
Max Weber offers this assessment:
Islam, a comparatively late product of Near Eastern monotheism, in which Old
Testament and Jewish-Christian elements played a very important role, 'accommodated'
itself unto the world in a very unique sense. In the first Meccan period of Islam, the
eschatological religion of Muhammed developed in pietistic urban conventicles which
displayed a tendency to withdraw from the world. 12
This is evidenced early on in the Koran Initially rejected and persecuted for his
prophetic visions, Muhammed took flight during the Hegira to gain adherents and
formulate an effectively organized band. Although Muhammed's martyrdom is inherently
less sensational and painful than his Judo-Christian forebears (involving a limited and
restrained persecution - banishment from Mecca), it does repeat similar themes. During
this period, as Weber suggests, Muhammed and his followers were content to remain
withdrawn from the rest of the Arab tribes and communities of the time. Rather than
aspiring to achieve political and military successes, Muhammed instead chose to remain
10Among the seven later "deacons" of Christ chosen by the twelve disciples, Stephen
is the most famous. His preaching and defense of Christ before the Jewish elders at the
Temple led to his stoning and subsequent martyrdom.
nFor an in depth review concerning martyrdom in early Christianity see John Foxe,
Foxe's Christian Martvrs of the World . (Westwood: Barbour Books, 1985), pp. 3-27.
12Weber, p. 262.
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ascetic and passive, and build unity amongst his faithful. When their faith was sufficient,
Allah would empower His prophet to deliver unto them their promised salvation. Only
later would Muhammed transform Islam from its early pristine form to one of a
communal form. 13
In summary, all martyrs during unitary religious movements, as their associated era
suggests, became hallowed symbols of religious unification. During these periods Judaic,
Christian, and Islamic martyrs remained ascetic and passive to gain favor with God. Also
during these religious periods the three monotheistic faiths embraced the belief that
although the final coming of God was predetermined, martyrdom could prove worthy of
a limited intercession by God on behalf of the martyr's entire community. This led to a
universal adoption within the faiths of a millenanan expectation, 14 or a belief that an
unrelenting faith and commitment to God would deliver a Messiah to initiate the
millennium, especially if that community had been graced by a martyr. In the Judeo-
Chnstian faiths, the example of one martyr caused others to follow in his path, initiating
an emulative and regenerative pattern. The paradigmatic martyrdom of Islam during this
period is limited to one exemplar - the Prophet Muhammed These characteristics,
however, would soon change
13
Ibid, p. 262.
:4For a more complete definition of millenanan expectation see David C. Rapoport,
"Terror and the Messiah: An Ancient Experience and Some Modern Parallels," in The
Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications , ed. David C. Rapoport and Yonah
Alexander, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp 13-42.
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B. THE SECTARIAN AND COMMUNAL FAITHS
For whatever reason, when the unitary faiths began to acquire a sectarian or communal
character, martyrs began to acquire an inherently more political and militant symbolic
nature. While not all "spinoff sects from the three religious faiths analyzed in the
previous section espoused a more political and militant path for their martyrs, at least
every faith produced one such sect that openly embraced this new breed of martyr. Let
us now examine the incorporation of this new found pattern.
By the middle of the Second Century BCE, the Jews in Palestine suffered renewed
persecutions, this time by the Seleucids. After murdering his brother Seleucus, Antiochus
IV Epiphenes, succeeded in securing the throne of the Seleucid Empire for himself.
Known by the Jews as "Antiochus the Wicked," 15 he proceeded not just to force
Hellenization upon his Jewish subjects but to de-nationalize them entirely. 16 The
Community of Jews became split between those who remained unfailingly loyal to Mosaic
Law and those who were willingly to accept the imposed hellemstic laws. H. H. Ben-
Sasson notes:
Mattathius became the recognized leader of the entire community of the Hasidim [the
pious ones] and was instrumental in adopting several important decisions that were
accepted by all the insurgents. Perhaps the most important of these was the ruling that
permitted the Jews to take up arms even on the Sabbath in order to repulse attacks. 17
By 168 BCE Mattathias' son, Judas of Maccabee, led the first of a series of uprisings
against the Seleucids. This would eventually obtain religious freedom for all Jews but also





established an autonomous, theocratic kingdom for the Jews in Palestine. Killed in battle,
Judas became the first paradigmatic martyr of the Jews in this new era.
Although successful in obtaining greater political stature for the Jews, the Meccabean
revolt was not instrumental in reunifying their community, nor did it prevent the renewal
of persecutions against them. Instead, a definitive generational pattern of sectarianism,
rebellion, persecution, and militant martyrdom ensued. Successive rulers in Jerusalem
would pay homage to their higher authorities by accepting sacrifices for the emperor,
displaying busts of emperors in the Temple, or adorning other hallowed places with
icons.
18
This inevitably led to charges of transgressions against Mosaic Law and caused
still other sects to break away from their Jewish community. These new sects often
maintained an exclusive communal and often militant character, rejecting their
incorporation into the Jewish community as a whole. They included the Sadducees,
Pharisees, and the Essenes and later a number of Zealot groups such as the Sicarii. Some
of these sects offered passive resistance to their rulers while others adopted full-scale
terrorist campaigns. 19 A panapoly of both passive and militant Judaic martyrs soon
followed.
Each rebellion would generally start with moderates leading their communities in
peaceful protest against the authorities only to be undermined by small, yet politicized
18
First, under Augustus Caesar the Jews were required to make sacrifices for the
emperor as a compromise to allow their right to worship and exempt their participation in the
imperial cult. Second, Herod and then Pontius Pilate tried to further please Rome by erecting
"standards" of the Empire in "the conventional way to symbolize" Jewish loyalty to Rome.





20 Under King Herod (around 4 CE), a student protest against golden
images of eagles adorning the Temple quickly turned into a violent demonstration as
members of the Temple proceeded to tear the golden eagles down. 21 Herod proclaimed
later that only the rabbis who had incited the students were to be burned alive for this
deed. With each succeeding generation, however, the level of atrocities grew until by 66
CE 22 , we can account for perhaps the greatest feat of mass martyrdom in history. Author
David C. Rapoport notes:
The fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple virtually ended resistance in
Judea. It was only a matter of time before the last stronghold at Masada fell. When
the Romans penetrated its outer defenses, the most spectacular act of Jewish despair
and defiance occurred. The entire garrison of nearly a thousand Sicarii, including
women and children, committed suicide rather than become Roman prisoners. 23
By 132 the Jews, nearly annihilated as a race, participated in the anticlimactic Bar
Kokhba Revolt. A Jewish rebel force led by Simon Bar Kokhba and inspired by a
number of militant rabbis participated in a desperate last stand against the Roman army.
Thousands of Jews were killed. 24 Those that were not slain were captured and subjected
to violent reprisals noted for their horrific tortures and deaths. These reprisals produced





"Author's Note: From this point on in the chapter all dates cited are within the
common era, therefore I will refrain from using the abbreviations CE and BCE.
23
Ibid, p. 26.
24Roman Historian Dio Cassius claimed that 580,000 Jews lost their lives in the Bar
Kokhba Revolt, as cited by Guenter Lewy, Religion and Revolution , (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1974), p. 91.
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martyrs is the Rabbi Akiba ben-Josef whose death sentence was carried out by having his
flesh torn off with a carding instrument :5 After the Jewish rebellion was finally defeated,
the Great Diaspora followed. Although disbanded as a people and cast off into the
hinterlands of Europe and Asia Minor, Jewish traditions were passed on. These included
the now vogue tradition of the politicized, militant martyr
Not more than two centuries after Jewish sectarian presence in the known world had
withered away, Christian sects had begun again to tread on the heels of their Jewish
antecedents. By the fourth century, Christianity had spread throughout much of Europe
and to other corners of civilization Slowly, it was embraced, almost universally, by
whole ethnic communities. It was during this time that "religion" and "community"
became synonymous and resulted in the conceptual foundation of a "national" church.
Implicit also within this synthesis was the politicization of religion and the slow erosion
of passive asceticism to political militancy in the Christian sectarian movements. 20 This
evolution is best illustrated by the establishment and early history of the Armenian
Church.
A federation of small feudal kingdoms at the periphery of Europe and the Middle
East, for centuries early Armenian society was under the domination of a number of
foreign powers. Rule of the kingdoms was granted to native functionaries who served
two communities - their foreign masters and their local populace. Their position was, at
"Singer, pp. 355-356.
26Khachig Toloyan, "Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion and Symbolic
Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora," Contemporary Research on Terrorism , ed. Paul
Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 90.
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best, a tenable one. If the local functionary was to succeed, he had to satisfy both groups.
First, he had to prove his loyalty and subservience to his overlord. Next, he had to
compete for and gain the acquiescence of the Armenian people. In short, the local
functionary had to be a shrewd and manipulative politician. Author Khachig Toloyan
notes that:
[local] elites [had to] claim to be warriors for the nation, caretakers of its all-too-
needy, or guardians of the immortal soul of the Armenian individuals and the equally
transcendent soul of the Nation. Such claims [were] formulated, disseminated, and
perpetuated principally in narratives which are part of the fabric of the culture, shaping
individual and collective self-conceptions..., what matters is that since the
establishment of the Armenian Church, the 'warrior' has come to imply martyrdom as
a necessary correlate, or has been replaced by it outright. The militant martyr has
become a substitute for the warrior in the cultural struggle for validation and
legitimacy. 27
We have to look no further than the narrative of Saint Vartan, father of the Armenian
nation, to prove Toloyan's assertion.
Faced by the almost certain political and religious subjugation under the invading
Persian Sassinid armies, Armenian Lord Vartan and members of his community took to
battle at Avarayr. Annihilated at this "last stand" in the year 450, the example of Vartan
and his followers eventually led to a Persian conciliation to Armenian religious suffrage
by 485. Nearly fifteen hundred years later, Vartan still generates an endearing and
passionate response from nearly all Armenians. Vartan is still seen as having risked all
in defense of Armenian Christianity and continues to be regarded as Armenia's most




American Knights of Vartan meetings - "I am Armenian., I am Armenian/The grandchild
of valiant Vartan." 28
Other Christian sects also mimicked the extremist zeal and fervor of the early Jewish
sects, especially when it came to the adoption of suicide in their struggles against a
repressive regime. The African Circumcelliones are a typical example of this early
Christian period. A Donatist sect of the fourth century, the Circumcelliones "combined
guerrilla activity against Catholic landowners with a greedy quest for martyrdom and with
mass suicide in the name of a strongly radical faith."
29
This adoption of suicide was a
shortlived phenomenon in Christian sectarian movements, however, as even the most
extreme sects later rejected it entirely arguing that it transgressed upon the sanctity of life
and the most precious teachings of Christ. 30
With regard to Islam, the transformation of the martyr image from one of passive
ascetic to political militant was a foreboding one even prior to the outgrowth of sectarian
movements. The manifestation of such changes were again evident in the persona of
Muhammed, this time immediately after the Meccan period Rather than aspiring to be
solely a religious leader and to forsake other worldly prizes, Muhammed became a
Prophet, Warrior, and King. He, in fact, became the ultimate charismatic claiming
extraordinary power in three domains - religious, military and political. Muhammed
28Cited in Ibid, p. 95.
29Cristiano Grottanelli, "Archaic Forms of Rebellion and their Religious Background,"
Religion. Rebellion, and Revolution: An interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collection of




enjoined mundane aspirations with spiritual faith in the hope that it would unite disparate
Arab tribes into one community. Islam therefore became not just a religion but a means
toward an authoritative lifestyle and an all inclusive social force. With this newfound
unified power soon came personal and tribal greed and after Muhammed's death the seeds
for Islamic sectarianism were not only planted but they began to blossom.
The immediate successors to the Prophet Muhammed, the first four caliphs, set out
to proselytize the word of Allah to all Arabs as well as to their former enemies - the
Persians, Egyptians, and Syrians. They also adhered to the Prophet's dictum of
conversion through conquest and intermarriage. However, Muhammed's own community
remained divided over how succession to His office would be decided. Some declared
that it should be a dynastic office remaining within the Prophet's family. Others felt that
the successor should be chosen from amongst the community thus enabling other tribes
a chance for a future share of power. The argument was allowed to rage on throughout
this period as evidenced by three of the first four caliphs being assassinated by contending
claimants to the office. 31 The caliphate assassinations had two important effects on the
Islamic community. First, they signalled a continuing and unresolved dispute over
succession to the Prophet. Second and most important, they provided the Islamic
31Omar, the second caliph, was assassinated in 644. The third caliph - Uthman,
chosen by a body of electors, was infamous for his nepotistic tendencies in doling out
communal favors. He in turn was assassinated in 656. The fourth caliph, Ali, was the first
successor to the Prophet that came from within His own clan. All's succession was
immediately disputed by among other sects, the Kharajites, who demanded his removal. The
dispute led to a revolt by Muawiya, a clansman of Uthman. Ali was eventually assassinated
by a Kharajite in 661 CE. For a brief history of the early caliphate see Langer, pp. 199-202.
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community with a fresh, first hand account of violent sacrifice and death in the Judeo-
Christian mold These two effects would account for the subsequent split of Islam into
its two great factions - the Sunni and the Shi'a - and the great militant martyred exemplar
of Shi'ism, Husayn.
After the fourth Caliph Ali was assassinated, Muawiya succeeded him despite All's
son Hasan's election to the office. Hasan subsequently abdicated in favor of Muawiya.
Before he died in 680, Muawiya declared that Yazid, his son, would follow him in the
Caliphate . Succession by this time was still a festering sore in the hearts and minds of
the Islamic community. When Muawiya failed to live up to either of the two predominant
expectations for succession, tensions exploded Husayn, another grandson of the Prophet,
was invited to take the office of the caliphate Before he got to Mecca, Husayn and his
army were deserted by the Meccans at Kerbela and here he was slain by Yazid's troops.
Embraced as a Shi'ite symbol of heroism and religious sanctity, Husayn is commemorated
yearly with a self flagellation ritual during the month of Muharrem.
Husayn's martyrdom so mobilized the Shi'ite community that it set the foundation for
a new communal office - the Imamate Dismissing years of pretentious successors to the
caliphate, Shi'as were finally empowered to worship and follow the Prophet's line of
descendency. Although now more politically mobilized, the Shi'as had to become more
quietest to ensure their survival under Yazid and his line. 32 This, however, did not ensure
peace and tranquility within their community. Soon thereafter Shi'ites suffered renewed
32Nikki R. Keddie, "Shi'ism and Revolution,
"
Religion, Rebellion, and Revolution , ed.
Bruce Lincoln, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp 159-160
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attacks against their community. The Imams were themselves subjected to tortuous death
and persecution by other Muslims, thereby mimicking the generational pattern of
martyrdom forged first by Judaism and then Christianity. Nevertheless, in death Husayn
achieved for the Shi'ite community political self determination and religious autonomy.
Thus, martyrs within the period of Sectarian and Communal Faiths can be
characterized as follows: 1) Increasingly, martyrs became symbols of exclusion, being
embraced by tribal and ethnic clans as a personified representation of their nations; 2)
Once nationalistic themes concerning martyrdom became commonplace, the essence of
the image took a sharp turn toward political militance, 3) Martyrdom was judged as a
necessary element for the eventual success of a community's cause, as it was often
followed by a concession from the contending authoritarian party, and 4) the example of
the paradigmatic martyr continued to stir emulation and generational adoption throughout
a number of sects. The former two characterizations represent a distinct shift from the
unitarian phase. The latter two characterizations, however, remain consistent with the
preceding phase of the martyr's service, especially within the realm of the millenanan
expectation and what we may now call consequential martyrs^ The era of sectarian and
communal faiths lasts to this day and these characterizations remain part of each sect's
religious folklore. By the late eighteenth century, however, these movements had been
33By this era it now becomes evident that a paradigmatic martyr paves the way, in all
cases, for others to follow in his path. All three families of sects universally adopt "mass
martyring" and the auspices of regenerative figures which invoke the image of the
paradigmatic martyr. From this point on in the thesis I shall refer to these icons as
consequential martyrs.
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slowly superimposed by predominantly political ideologies This new age, the era of
secularization, would define still other roles for the martyr as a tool of persuasion
C. THE SECULAR IDEOLOGIES
The new era of secularization proved to be almost paradoxical with regard to the
martyr. Initiated by a land founded on religious faith, especially rooted in the Puritan
sects, America was to catalyze an areligious and political path for other nations and
disparate secular ideologies to follow for the next two centuries. God and church,
although still very much a part of societies at large, were swallowed up by the rhetoric
of the civic religion of politics. State governments acquired powers that had hitherto been
held by authorities within national churches This became true no matter what the civic
faith in question - liberal democracy, socialism/communism, or fascism - and would hold
the key to a foreboding change in the character and role of the secular martyrs. As such,
this section addresses the onset of the secular age and its affect on martyrdom.
The American Revolution was truly the first to catalyze the new age of secularization.
Overwhelmingly a nation of Protestants, America's founding fathers knew too well of past
religious persecutions by monarchial overlords in Europe These persecutions, in fact,
provided the impetus for their forebears' exodus to America throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries CE. Thus, religious toleration and the rejection of a national
church headed by a central authority became inherent and integral themes in the pending
design for this new nation. To achieve these ends, America's elites proposed a unique
system of governance - liberal democracy Decidedly more egalitarian than any form of
25
government of its time, this system led to a slow but marked erosion of religious ideals.
This was especially true in the character of martyrs throughout the age.
We should look no further than the penultimate martyr of the American Revolution -
Nathan Hale. For his famous last request, "Give me liberty or give me death!" signalled
a dramatic change in the martyr Formerly a communal hero's sacrifice was pronounced
in the name of God's salvation and redemption for a nation, appropriately defined by one
religion or another. In the case of the martyred Hale's, however, religion mattered little.
Instead it was overshadowed by the survival and independence of an American state.
Author Eyal Naveh notes:
The signers of the Declaration of Independence acknowledged their readiness for
martyrdom when they pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to the
cause of freedom. Many Americans believed that George Washington made
immeasurable sacrifices for the cause of liberty when he suffered with the half-clothed,
half frozen heroes at Valley Forge. Familiar with the general heritage of sacrifice and
martyrdom, American authors, poets, preachers, and popular historians applied the title
martyr to specific individuals. They thus strove to invest the American national
experience with transcendent meaning and to strengthen the American national
consciousness through solidarity with the sacrifice of a dead hero. 34
The expectation for America's Utopia had been defined by words like "freedom," "liberty,"
and "solidarity." Egalitarian and unifying slogans such as "All men are created equal" and
"Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," had replaced exclusionary national ethnic
chants. Also noticeable was that man was increasingly more responsible for his own
"salvation" and "redemption." God's grace was now playing second fiddle to mankind's
militancy.
34 Eyal Naveh, Crown of Thorns: Political Martyrdom in America from Abraham
Lincoln to Martin Luther King. Jr. (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 3.
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Almost two decades after the American experience, the seeds for liberal democracy
were sown again, this time in France. While almost all American Revolutionists adhered
to some religious higher calling, a rather large group of French Revolutionists rejected all
forms of religion and began to preach an anti religion based upon "Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity."
35 Author Lynn Hunt notes:
...revolutionary language was nonetheless resolutely secular in content. As the
battlelines with the church became clearer, as they did almost immediately,
revolutionaries eliminated most positive references to Christianity from their
vocabulary. This rejection of Christian or Catholic references was yet another way of
announcing the revolutionary break with the French and European cast. The new
social contract needed no analogy to Biblical covenants, it was grounded in reason and
the natural rights of man.
3"
Lady Liberty replaced the Virgin Mary in the state seal Hercules became the God-like
Father of France in the pantheon of state monuments to the revolution. Churches
throughout France were closed and the Cathedral at Notre Dame was reopened as the
Temple of Reason. 37 It became readily apparent that although religion had no place in
the revolution, it was not entirely discarded Rituals, allegories, and symbols were still
35Most notable among the anti religious elements within the new French Republic
came from the Hebertist faction of the Jacobin societies. For a summary of their activities
see Christopher Dawson, The Gods of Revolution, (New York: New York University Press,
1972), pp. 82-100.
36Lynn Hunt, Politics. Culture, and Class un the French Revolution
.
(Berkeley:
University of California, 1984), p. 28
37See Hunt, pp. 65-119 and Dawson, pp. 95-100.
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present, but now they were dressed in purely secular motifs. This was also true with the
revolution's martyrs.
The most famous martyr of French anti-clericalism was the Swiss philosopher, writer,
and doctor Jean Paul Marat. An atheist, Marat "had preached the gospel of terror," 38
while leading the Committee for Public Safety as a means to keep the state united and
supreme. After Marat's 1793 assassination by a provincial patriot, Charlotte Corday, the
anti-religious extremists - the sansculottes - declared him their patron saint. The
manifestation of the martyr's paradox had now been fully realized. Never before in
history had a self-professed and devout atheist been regarded as a sacred figure. Once
purely a symbol of religion, the martyr had evolved into a pure symbol of totalitarian
politics. Marat's example of martyrdom would signal a path for its adoption by the
succeeding totalitarian ideologies of communism and fascism.
Communism, concocted by atheists Marx and Engels in the middle of the nineteenth
century, made its first successful entrance into state politics in the 1917 Russian
Revolution. It became apparent that communism, based upon the preeminence of scientific
method and the rejection of any eschatological dogma of idealism, and martyrdom were
to be incompatible concepts. Lenin, himself an atheist, ardently opposed any mention of
religious themes in his revolutionary drive to power. 39 This communist rejection of
38Dawson, p. 65.
39To support this contention I present the following evidence. First, in his letters to
Gorky, Lenin proclaimed that "the god of the god builders is no different than any other god,
the belief in god is 'necrophilia'..." Another example of Lenin's disdain for religion and
anything sacred including martyrs came from a story retold by AG. Rashin. Lenin's wife
Krupskaia reportedly told her husband "that some soldiers she had met on [her train] trip had
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martyr images, however, was shortlived In fact, it took less than two decades for
communists to finally embrace martyrs as tools of political persuasion. The backdrop for
this reversal of policy was the Spanish Civil War and its catalysts were the writers who
covered the bloody conflict.
The failure of the Spanish Republic to effectively govern and maintain civility over
its populace has been well documented by scholars for decades. Spanish Republican
authorities were so weakened by internal ideological factionalism that the country was
predestined for an external solution In this case, the solution as defined by the
international community was to ensure that one ideology above all others would survive
in Spain. Americans and Britons were adamant over their support to maintain a
democratic republic in Spain European Leftists (Communists, Socialists, and Anarchists)
were equally determined to provide Spain the opportunity for alternate forms of
governance. Finally, Fascists in Germany and Italy, opposed to the spreading Communist
threat, deemed it essential to support Franco's pronunciamiento in the hope that it would
maintain a fascist flavor The war thus became internationalized, as volunteers flocked
to Spain to save the country from certain ideological menace Naturally, these idealistic
volunteers were followed by their native correspondents eager to report home from the
war front.
been told by a priest that Bolsheviks were like the apostles, going to the people to bring light
and truth. Lenin responded that the form of the simile was wrong but that its idea was true."
See Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives: The Lenin Cult in Soviet RussiaiCambndge: Harvard
University Press, 1983), pp. 22 and 69.
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As the conflict grew it soon became obvious that the war would provide journalists,
writers, and poets with an abundance of heroes Every ideology in succession embraced
a martyr in Spain,
40
eventually even the communists. On 13 December, 1936 the
communists finally found theirs in the persona of German International Brigade
Commissar Hans Beimler. His candidacy to martyrdom was a likely one. An escaped
prisoner from Dachau Prison in Germany, Beimler had previously been subjected to Nazi
persecution, after once serving as an elected communist member to the Riechstag. In
Spain, however, he became chief political officer for the International Brigades and was
killed in battle at Madrid. After his death, his martyrdom was commemorated in song for
his communist comrades to sing before battle. 41 Communists, and leftists in general, had
finally come to embrace martyrs. Their value as a symbol for organizational unity was
hard to ignore. This pattern would spread to the Americas and throughout the
international community as evidenced by the now famous international revolutionary
martyr - Ernesto "Che" Guevara. While the path to martyrdom was initially hard to
swallow for communists, it was easy medicine to take for fascists.
40The martyrs of the Spanish Civil War represented the gamut of political ideologies
present in the conflict. Rightist factions (Falangists, JONS, et al) claimed the assassinated
Jose Antonio Pnmo de Rivera, son of the former Spanish dictator and the Falangist's founder,
and Onesimo Redondo, who died in action at Alto de Leon; Monarchists claimed Jose Calvo
Sotelo, allegedly murdered by Spanish Communists; Anarchists claimed Buenaventura
Durruti, their leader killed in action in Madrid; Prommcamiento officers loyal to Franco
claimed Luis Guzman Moscardo, son of the Colonel who waited out the siege of the Alcazar
at Toledo. For a survey of these martyrs see the definitive work by Hugh Thomas, The
Spanish Civil War
.
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 3-957.
4 George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars . (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 191.
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The power of martyrs was immediately recognized and martyrdom was embraced early
on by fascist ideologies. 42 The Nazi rise to power in Germany, in fact, owed its successes
in part to early and effective propaganda campaigns using martyrs. The myth surrounding
the fallen soldiers at Langemarck during the First World War is one such example.
Author Jay W. Baird notes:
Eleven thousand young men lie buried in the student cemetery at Langemarck,
testifying to the depravity of war Yet through propaganda and poetry their graves
were rendered sacred shrines. They had not died, instead their souls had passed the
earthly boundaries and had been transfigured Their blood sacrifice had guaranteed the
nation's future... The image of the purity of the youth of Langemarck had an
undeniable transcendent force. 43
Langemarck provided an effective allegory to validate the Nazi claim that struggle and
war are the supreme activities in which man can participate. 44 Soldiers and hence war
were thus easily glorified. The soldier-martyrs also proved to be reliable tools to further
Hitler's strategy of divide and rule within his own army as Josef Goebbels ensured that
each military' organization could claim an archetypical martyr The SA identified with
its fallen songwriter Horst Wessel. Herbert Norkus - butchered by communist thugs -
inspired the Hitler Youth organizations Assassinated Obergruppenfiihrer Reinhard
Heydrich served as a symbol for the SS. Finally, the Luftwaffe commemorated their
^Ladislas Farago, et al, German Psychological Warfare
,
(New York: G.P Putnam and
Sons, 1942), pp. 159-160.
43Jay W. Baird, To Live and Die for Germany:Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon .
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 4.
44 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Militarv Relations , (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1985), p 91
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leading fallen ace, Colonel Werner Molders. 45 Summarizing a German faith in their
martyrs Reichsmarshall Herman Goring stated, "A nation with such heroes is assured of
victory."
46
The secular age again redefined the role and character of martyrs. Overwhelmingly
dressed in soldiers' uniforms, martyrs continued along a decidedly, if not wholly, political
and militant path. Once a symbol that represented the expectation of God's intercession,
it now signified the expectation of a man-made Utopia on earth. This Utopia would be
particularly noted for its egalitananism. The expanse of secular ideologies used martyrs
in one or more ways. These included the use of martyrs: 1) as unifying agents for their
states, 2) as international political agents to further their cause across state borders, or 3)
as unifying forces for sub-national, organizational entities. Paradigmatic martyrs, while
still providing for the initial catalyst for others to follow began to lose their primacy as
propaganda campaigns boasted of quantities of fallen martyrs and tended to overlook the
quality of one particular exemplar sacrifice. What remained a constant during this age,
however, was the continued increase of their use across a wide spectrum of nations.
The final phase of martyrdom - a slow transition from the age of secularism - which
we find ourselves in today, is the age of revolutionary faiths and religious
fundamentalism. Liberal democracy has reigned supreme during and after the ideological
battlegrounds of World War II and the Cold War. Nations disappointed by experiments
in fascist, communist, and socialist governments have subsequently undergone a loss of
45For a more complete survey of Nazi martyrs see Baird, pp. 1-245.
46Cited in Ibid, p. 228.
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ideological faith, identity, and worth. 47 These nations have now been forced to either
acquiesce to democracy or find alternative ideologies, either through creation or adoption
of pre-existing faiths. The trend, especially amongst Third World countries, is to either
re-embrace primordial governance defined centuries ago by religion and communal
identity or to adopt a new revolutionary faith. It is this phenomenon that sets the course
for contemporary martyrs.
D. THE REVOLUTIONARY FAITHS AND FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIONS
Since we find ourselves in a transition from the age of secularism, the number of
martyr cases for analysis remains somewhat more limited than those of past phases. What
is certain, however, is that martyrs in today's age follow one of two paths - one reborn,
the other synthesized The former path describes a renewal of faiths whose original goals
enjoined both political and religious goals Most notable among these are the extremist
factions from sectarian movements, especially from Shi'ite groups, orthodox Jewish sects,
and even Christian cults The latter path describes one that until just recently had not
existed before. Joining tenets of socialism and communism with religion this ideology
prescribes armed struggle and pastoral consecration as a remedy against reactionary and
oppressive social systems. Known as Liberation Theology, it has been embraced by a
number of radical priests in Latin America for the past thirty years. These two paths
would forge yet another direction for martyrs and their roles in society
4
I want to stress that I am including the disappointment and rejection of these
ideologies by the former colonies of these nations as well
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Fundamentalist religious movements have become the recent villain in a western
democratic campaign to find new national and international enemies since the fall of the
"red menace." While most sectarian movements, labelled as fundamentalist, are
peaceable, there exist factions which have pursued campaigns of terror to achieve both
political and religious goals. It is these groups that receive much of the media attention
throughout the western world and it is from them that we find our most recent cases of
martyrdom. One such breeding ground for these images has been the on-going anti-
confessional struggle in Lebanon.
A country torn apart by violence, Lebanon has suffered through an on-again, off-again
civil war since 1975. The struggle for power became even more complicated as old
religious divisions grew into new political divisions. This caught once united sectarian
communities in the middle as contending parties competed for their essential bases of
support. One such competition used mass martyring strategies as a means to validate and
legitimate political movements and attract notice from a community already entranced
with martyr worship - the Lebanese Shi'ites. The Shi'ite Hezbollah and Amal movements
used martyrs as tools to gain political and religious authority from their constituency, yet
their operations devolved quickly into sacrificial competition. Author Martin Kramer
states:
Not only did these operations drive away the foreign enemies of Lebanon's Shi'ites;
they also served to forestall the outbreak of fratricidal violence from within. The
competitive cycle of sacrifice, done in the name of Islam, averted a competitive cycle
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among adherents of Islam. When this sacrificial cycle collapsed, the violence turned
inward upon Lebanon's, in the form of a fratricidal war. 48
Kramer attributes the breakdown in the sacrificial cycle to the issuance of a Shi'a clerical
ban on martyrdom. This ruling restricted martyrdom unless it "'[could] be carried out ...
[to] bring about a political or military change in proportion to the passions that incite a
person to make of his body an explosive bomb.'" 49 This left Hezbollah and Amal without
an outlet for rivalry. Soon mass martyrdom was followed by sectarian fratricide as
Hezbollah and Amal turned on each other in the summer of 1988 50 Martyrs, while
effective as mobilization weapons against an enemy, also proved to be de-stabilizing
agents and caused the creation of new enemies.
Liberation Theology, our second contemporary ideological proving ground for martyrs,
offers a number of cases for analysis The earliest and probably most famous of these is
Father Camilo Torres, revolutionary radical priest from Colombia His example remains
the best to examine due to his prolific literary works Guenter Lewy provides a telling
summary of Torres' beliefs:
In another editorial, Message to the Communists, of September 2 [1965], Torres sought
to clarify his relationship to the Communist Party, a participant in the United Front
I am a revolutionary Torres declared, and because 'the Communist Party has elements
that are authentically revolutionary I cannot, either as a Colombian, or as a socialist,
or as a Christian, or as a priest, be anti-Communist.' I will not join their ranks, but 'I
am ready to fight alongside them for common goals: opposing the oligarchy and the
domination of the United States, in order to take power for the popular class.' Pope
48Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon,
"
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John had authorized such collaboration, and 'the example of Poland shows us that
Socialism can be built without destroying the essentials of Christianity.'51
Torres was killed during a guerrilla ambush on a Colombian Army patrol on 15 February
1966. "For some Colombian Catholics," as well as other Latin American priests, "Torres
[is] a martyr" that represents a struggle against western imperialism, native oppressive
regimes, "and the clerical establishment." 52
Decidedly militant, martyrs in this new age of Revolutionary Religion and Religious
Fundamentalism have rediscovered elements of religious orientation. In the case of the
Fundamentalists we have seen an overwhelming tendency to adopt the martyr as a symbol
of mass violence and terrorism. 53 So much so that the image has had a debilitating effect
upon the movement which embraces it. In the case of Liberation Theology, martyrs have
remained as less spectacular symbols but reincorporating the religious aura with
increasingly representation by a number of radical clerics. Although the impact has
apparently waned in those countries that once embraced them wholeheartedly, liberation
theology continues to be practiced throughout Latin America. It is my contention that
51Camilo Torres as cited in Guenter Lewy, p. 524.
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Ibid, p. 525.
53This pattern follows closely the mass suicide operations of the Jewish Zealots at
Masada and the Christian Circumcelliones in Africa, as evidenced by the Jonestown Massacre
in Guyana and the Branch Dravidian Raid in Texas. It also includes, however, recent mass
slaughters conducted by fervent followers of particular extremist groups against other religious
groups [to wit. the recent Mosque massacre of Arab Palestinians in the Occupied Territories
in Israel]. In both cases, the level of violence and resultant deaths have been spectacularly
grotesque.
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although the martyr's path remains to be placed in its proper focus of late, it will continue
along one of these newfound paths in the immediate future
E. SUMMARY
Martyrs are a rather recent creation within the history of mankind. First conceived
and utilized by the unitarian faiths as symbols to unite and reward conformity, they were
universally passive and ascetic ascribing to an other worldly calling. Once martyrs
became synonymous with ethnic or sectarian groups, they began to acquire a political and
militant character, as various groups laid claim to their particular patron saint. During this
age martyrs became exclusive symbols. They also represented an unrelenting faith in the
expectation of religious salvation and political autonomy. This trend continued until
virtually all auspices of religious affiliation and association previously maintained by the
martyr were abolished in the secular age of politics Secular martyrs retained the belief
that an expected Utopia would be bestowed upon his followers, but clearly defined in
purely political terms such as equality, freedom, and liberty. Finally, in today's world
martyrs have re-embraced a religious aura - either by falling back on age old sectarian
faiths or by constructing a revised ideology based on religious and contemporary political
ideologies. Each phase along the martyr's historical life has been defined by a number
of paradigmatic exemplar only to be followed by a substantial number of followers
establishing a generational pattern. In any case, the martyr's political and militant use has
increased drastically and its passive and ascetic nature has eroded. An illustration tracing
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F. CONCLUSIONS
The martyr's path for the last two centuries has been overwhelmingly politicized and
decidedly militant. Nothing suggests that this course will change While there have been
recent exceptional cases of passive martyrs, such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma
Ghandi, even these figures maintained largely political views rather than a withdrawn
course for their community's causes. It becomes readily apparent that although religious
overtones have reshaped the martyr's character, the specter of ethnic divisions so
widespread in today's world will force this symbol to regain an exclusive nature. This
exclusivity will necesarily propel it into symbolizing armed struggle much as it did during
the era of sectarian movements and communal faiths. In this regard, martyrs will
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continue to retain their powerful ability to awaken social conciousness, entrance
populations to support one cause or another, and stir countless numbers toward violence
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III. THE MARTYRS CONSTRUCT
When commenting on political movements in armed struggles with authorities, Richard
E. Rubinstein states that, "A [revolutionary] movement needs martyrs as well as victors;
sooner or later, one's daring sacrificial deeds will inspire a mass revolt." After surveying
the lot of revolutionary movements since the end of the eighteenth century, it is evident
that Rubinstein's claim is somewhat boastful and exaggerated. Not every revolutionary
movement has embraced martyrs as inspirational symbols. In fact, martyrs have been
largely absent in some of the most successful revolutions throughout history. What can
be said, however, is that all revolutions provide a conditional environment for the
adoption of personified symbols of reverence and emulation. Included in this family of
revolutionary symbols are heroes and patriots Not surprisingly, those revolutions which
remained martyr-less relied instead upon these latter, more common symbols of honor to
attract notice to their cause and mobilize support.
Immediately a number of questions arise from these assertions. First, what makes a
revolutionary martyr different from patriots or a heroes in armed political struggles? And
second, what are the conditions prevalent in all revolutions that contribute to the creation
of this family of symbols? To answer these questions I have surveyed and examined the
vast literature published concerning political symbol theory and treatises on revolution.
Next I sought to synthesize elements of these theories to help explain the presence or
absence of martyrs in revolution. What results is an in-depth analysis of the creation of
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revolutionary martyrs, spanning the spectrum of political ideologies and religious faiths.
This chapter uses a contingency argument 1 to help illustrate those conditions which
contribute to the creation of personified symbols in revolution. I have categorized these
conditions into one of two areas - necessary and sufficient. Necessary conditions are
those which are common to the creation of all three personified symbols in revolution.
These conditions explain the social environment, particular events, and social elements
which are necessary to stimulate certain cognitive impulses in the human psyche to create
symbols. Once created they also give rise their incorporation in the revolutionary
movement. On the other hand, sufficient conditions provide the "critical mass" for the
creation of the martyr alone. These conditions which I will also refer to as the Sacred
"X" Factors, also explain why martyrs are inherently more powerful symbols than heroes
and patriots. Finally, I will offer two cases for study and analysis The first case - the
Russian Revolution - will be used to explain and account for the absence of martyrs in
revolutionary movements The latter case - the Spanish Civil War - will help explain the
presence of a multitude of martyrs in revolution Let us now set out on our course.
A. NECESSARY CONDITIONS
The first necessary condition for the creation of heroes, patriots and martyrs in
revolution is what I shall term social ebullience Within this environment institutions
"I assert that this argument is based on a number of contingencies inherent within
society. The revolutionary martyr's construct is therefore dependent upon social conditions,
the actions that social groups party to the revolution decide to take, specific events, and the
cultural value systems that impinge upon contingencies. For a more thorough overview of
this distinctive type of theory see Johnson, pp. 169-194.
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once responsible and adept at overseeing the maintenance of civility and order, such as
governments, schools, and organized religions, are now entirely incapable of handling
these responsibilities. What exists instead is a society in chaos, imploding upon itself.
Mircea Eliade writes:
The destruction of an established order, the abolition of an archetypal image, was
equivalent to a regression into chaos, into the pre-formal, undifferentiated state that
preceded the cosmogony. Let us note that the same images are still invoked in our
own days when people want to formulate the dangers that menace a certain type of
civilization: there is much talk of 'chaos', of 'disorder,' of the 'dark ages' into which 'our
world' is subsiding. All these expressions, signify the abolition of an order, of a
Cosmos, of a structure, and the re-immersion of a state that is fluid, amorphous, in the
end chaotic. 2
Whatever causes can be attributed to this condition, chaos "incapacitate[s] the routine
institutional procedures and arrangements of a system for self-maintenance" 3 including
those which secure meaning to social values and meanings.
But social ebullience encompasses more than this. The formerly recognized social
groupings which had at one time participated within the old order - political parties,
denominational faiths, civic organizations, etc. - are themselves disintegrating into newly
formed and competing entities. This uncontrolled social decay inevitably leads to a
"chronic state of threat."
4
Conservative social groups who had remained content with the
existing status and power relationships perceive that these new groupings threaten the
continued existence of the established authority Likewise new contending groups feel
2Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism , trans.Philip
Mairet, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), p. 38.
3Johnson, p. 73.
4Kenneth Jowitt, "Charisma,"lecture delivered to the students of the National Security
Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 19 August 1993.
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threatened by their lack of influence upon the now weakened social system. 5 The
perception of threats, if left without resolution, naturally devolves into the adoption and
rationalization of violence by groups within the social system to establish order. 6 Social
psychologist, Rene Girard characterizes this phenomenon as reciprocal violence, where
"violence roams at will, unchallenged and unchecked. " 7 Thus, the barbarous tactics
which we so readily associate with rival groups contending for power in revolution, are
the natural end state of social ebullience.
The next necessary condition for the adoption of heroes, patriots and martyrs in
revolution is what shall be termed the personified object ofrivalry. This condition closely
follows social ebullience in that it is directly dependent upon a number of contingencies
stemming from the social environment First, two or more inanimate entities, such as
political parties or religious orders, must participate in a clearly recognized and violent
struggle for the same prize In revolution this usually encompasses land, governance, or
the exercise of particular rights During this struggle one or the other entity will always
be characterized as either the "side of tyranny" or "the side of the oppressed." 8 Next,
5Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence
.
(New
York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 24-30
6
Ibid, p. 24.
7Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred , trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns




there also must be some singular act9 which displays this rivalry - one agent of the
"oppressed" must in some manner suffer adversity at the hands of the tyrannical power.
Therefore, both parties are in some way responsible for and contribute to the aura of this
rivalry. Still only an event up to this point, the rivalry takes on symbolic form due to
socio-psychological impulses.
The personified object of rivalry depends upon the cognitive processes of the human
mind which create the impetus behind the creation of new symbols. Authors Charles D.
Elder and Roger W. Cobb explain:
New symbols are created when people find available symbols inadequate to capture
or give expression to their experiences, feelings or beliefs. This is likely to occur in
the face of dramatic events or major changes in the natural, social, or political
environment. In such circumstances, a symbol may emerge more or less spontaneously
from the facts of the situation. 10
The prevalent, uncontrolled violence that contributed to chaos and was responsible for
undermining the previous order of social values and meanings has now created a catalytic
event to transpose new meaning to elements within society. The personified object of
rivalry therefore provides a common referent for shared information, values, and anxieties.
It also offers a singular and simplified experience which summarizes and condenses the
9The Nazi SS were masters at preventing the creation of martyrs and heroes by
incorporating mass punishment and execution. See Barnngton Moore, Injustice: The Social
Bases of Obedience and Revolt . (New York: M.E. Sharp, 1978), pp. 72-73. In this passage,
Moore describes the calculated schemes that SS prison guards used toward this end. "If a
prisoner tried to protect others and it came to the guard's attention, the prisoner was usually
killed. But if his action came to the knowledge of the camp administration, the whole group
was always punished severely. In this way the group came to resent its protector because he
brought them suffering."
10Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb, The Political Uses of Symbols . (New York:
Longman, 1983), p. 30.
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complex surroundings during revolutions to enable continued communication within
groups.
11
The tendency of groups to adopt personified symbols to explain the complexities
surrounding them is common throughout history. One such example of this tendency was
an early reference to the state in world politics. Michael Walzer explains:
The state is invisible, it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before
it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived. An image like the body politic,
then is not simply a decorative metaphor, applied by a writer who has already grasped
the nature of political association and now wishes to felicitously to convey his
understanding. Rather, the image is prior to understanding or, at any rate, to theoretic
understanding, as it is to articulation, and necessary to both." 12
During revolution, the affirmation of social identities and self worth is constantly
challenged. 13 The personification of symbols is therefore a primordial attempt to restore
these lost identities and rebuild social value Hence, it follows that heroes, patriots, and
martyrs, are not only natural and appropriate symbols that are created to describe the
inherent rivalries found in revolution They are also agents of restoration for a collective
identity Having actually participated in the struggle, these personified symbols are first-
hand and logical choices for all societies to turn to create order from cognitive disorder.
The last necessary condition for the creation of heroes, patriots, and martyrs is an
audience. Audiences communicate, explain, and expound upon these symbols by
accounting for and retelling the incidents surrounding the example of a particular
11
Ibid, p. 31.
^Michael Walzer, "On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought," Political Science




individual. Obviously, if there is no audience, there can be no hero, patriot, or martyr.
It is my contention, however, that there exists two types of audiences - one real and one
created. The first type, the real audience, is one which is actually present to witness the
acts of heroism, patriotism, and martyrdom which are responsible for the creation of their
symbols. The second type, the created audience, is somewhat less understood and more
difficult to explain. I will, however, use a familiar theoretical puzzle involving a falling
tree in the forest to help illustrate my contention.
The puzzle, as it has been posed countless times, is simply: "Does a tree that falls in
the forest, without the benefit of one to hear it, make a sound9 " Respondents are
traditionally divided into two camps - one affirming the existence of sound, the other
denying it. The latter camp takes a rather mathematical approach to the puzzle. They
explain that sound is a product of two variables - an originator and a receptor. The
absence of one or the other, they believe, degrades the process into one of non-existence.
The former camp, which I support, adheres to theoretical logic. We know that trees exist
virtually everywhere. We also know that from time to time they fall. Some of us have
even witnessed the crash of a tree falling to the ground. Thus, by mere suggestion of a
fallen tree, we can stimulate an audience to imagine the sound such a crash would make.
We can easily draw a parallel from the fallen tree in the puzzle and personified
symbols. Social groups know that heroes, patriots, and martyrs exist, especially within
revolutions. They are also well aware and familiar with the violence that begets death
and injury. Thus, it does not take a great leap of faith to imagine the conditions
surrounding the death of an individual after a suggestion of those circumstances has been
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publicized. Once a suggestion of heroism, patriotism, or martyrdom has been made, the
impetus behind personified symbol creation can and has been set in motion. This is not
to imply that suggestion is as powerful as reality. If an audience has been created by
suggestion and association, it is more likely to require additional substantiation if the
original allegations have been challenged Created audiences, therefore require constant
manipulation. Given this manipulation, created audiences for personified symbols can
be just as effective as one which is real.
In review, the necessary conditions for the construction of heroes, patriots and martyrs
in revolution are closely analogous to symbol formation processes. Social ebullience, a
term used to describe the chaos, violence and rivalry prevalent in revolutions, is
responsible for collective cognitive dissonance. During this social decay, existing values
and symbols no longer adequately explain the nature of social interaction. Hence, there
exists a need for the creation of new symbols. Using psychological theory and historical
cases, we have shown that personified objects of rivalry are overwhelmingly popular
choices for new symbols within revolutionary societies These personified symbols
provide a singular, momentous event - a reference point - that summarizes and condenses
social chaos and affords greater understanding to the collective consciousness. Finally,
audiences act as conductors for the transposition of meaning to these new personified
symbols and they serve as the key communicative element
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B. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS - THE SACRED "X" FACTORS
Up to this point in the chapter, I have described the social environment, particular
events, and social elements which account for the creation of personified symbols in
revolution. Although historically used as synonymous terms and serving similar purposes
- heroes, patriots, and martyrs - are, in fact, disparate symbols. Martyrs stand alone from
the other two personified symbols in revolution, in that they are responsible for the
construction of what I have previously labelled paradigmatic truth u
Most political symbolism theorists generally agree that there exists a vertical hierarchy
of symbols with some standing out as more powerful than others. 15 Author Murray
Edelman explains that symbols:
that purport to deal with first causes of future developments and therefore are least
susceptible to empirical verification are (1) at the top of the hierarchy, (2) most
directly associated with the emotions of fear, anger, dominance, and submission, and
(3) associated with a reference group patterning such that conformity to the dominant
cognitions (rather than success in action) is rewarded and lack of conformity is
punished. 16
All martyrs meet these criteria. Firstly, we have previously established that martyrs,
particularly those in revolution, help manifest and induce a millenanan expectation within
14
It is important to note here that I am avoiding the use of a predominant term - myth
- used most frequently in the literature of sociology. Myth is a value laden term in that it
roughly equates to a reference of a false, unfounded, or empirically unproven story. A
paradigmatic truth is in fact a charter for the construction of a social reality and is regarded
by its believers as an unwavering force. It represents truth, credibility, and legitimate
authority. See Lincoln, pp. 23-25.
15Among these theorists are Cobb and Elder, pp. 38-40, Edelman, pp. 41-44, and
Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," American Political Science Review,
(September, 1960), p. 556.
16Edelman, p. 42.
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their communities. Secondly, we have also recognized that martyrs embody an aura of
persecution which invokes strong emotive, often sympathetic, sentiments. Finally, this
sympathy, while not always honored or revered, can at least be respected. When
comparing the same criteria to patriots and heroes in revolution, it becomes obvious that
as a collective body these figures don't adhere to the apex of the hierarchy, in absolute
terms. Furthermore, Murray argues that those symbols that embrace "a divinely willed
or inevitable status and of close attachment to a movement that is just and destined to
succeed in exterminating evil"
17
are those most likely singled out from all others in this
hierarchy.
Revolutionary martyrs, even when used in a secular sense, are sacrosanct figures
Originally, merely witnesses to God's grace, martyrs rose to be regarded as first among
a messiah's followers. They were conceived to be extraordinary beings which possessed
extraordinary powers These powers included a vision for redemption and a special
influence with a higher authority that would intercede on behalf of one group to help
sustain, if not sway their struggle toward victory Heroes and patriots, on the otherhand,
are ordinary beings who perform extraordinarily well in given situations. They are
susceptible to human frailty and weaknesses and they often fall from grace. 18 Thus,
17
Ibid, p. 42.
18To provide an example of this distinction, Eyal J. Naveh argues effectively that
President John Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. were exceptional candidates for
martyrdom during America's revolution-like atmosphere of the 1960s. However, only King
retained that honor. Subsequently undermined by the country's role Vietnam, his family's
aristocratic lifestyle, and reported moral improprieties, after death Kennedy was left as
something of "a controversial hero and had certainly not turned into an enduring martyr."
Naveh, p. 176.
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martyrs maintain a supernatural specter of holiness or even in the purest secular sense -
a divine righteousness - that has always been beyond reproach and is held as
paradigmatically true.
Why, then, don't all revolutions incorporate martyrs as propaganda tools? This
question poses an even greater dilemma in light of the premises established in the
previous chapter. These were: 1) All revolutionary movements have one important,
intrinsic commonality - a millenanan expectation, 19 2) Western society, in the tradition
of the monotheistic faiths, first characterized the concept of a millenanan expectation with
the coming of a messiah, and 3) It was the messianic figure that served as the
foundational basis for the martyr. Many scholars have, therefore, purported that martyrs
are exclusive only to those cultures imbued with a tradition of monotheistic beliefs,
particularly Christianity. 20
At the surface, this belief retains a substantial degree of plausibility. The vast
majority of martyrs are conceived from those cultures firmly embedded with Judaic,
Christian, or Islamic traditions. However, a more thorough examination of revolutionary
martyrs renders the former assertion as a somewhat oversimplified explanation. Mao Tse
Tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Revolution, was neither Jew, nor Christian, nor
19John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: an introduction to the analysis of a political
phenomenon
.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 15-18. In this passage he
describes revolutionary movements as analogous to modern millenanan movements in that
they are "so Utopian as to be quite aptly characterized as millenanan."
20Among them Rapoport, Vytautas Kavolis, "Models of Rebellion,", Richard C.
Martin, "The Study of Religion and Violence," in The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and
Secular Justifications , ed. Rapoport and Alexander, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1989), pp. 3-42, 43-61, 127-132, 349-373, and Naveh, p. 1.
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Muslim, but still he martyred his fallen comrades with a monument in Tiananmen Square
to those who died in the Long March. Likewise, today in Sri Lanka, the predominantly
Hindu Tamil Tigers have also adopted martyrs. 21
I therefore argue that martyrs in revolution are not exclusive to nations bound to
monotheistic beliefs and value systems Rather martyrs are apt to appear in those cultures
that have been formerly conditioned by some messianic movement. In all cases where
revolutionary martyrs appear in predominantly non-monotheistic cultures, there existed
some previous, recognizable messianic source injected into that culture Therefore, the
adoption of revolutionary martyrs are contingent upon some form of messianic cultural
conditioning 22 To help illustrate this term let's use the previously mentioned two cases
where martyrs were used during eastern revolutions - Mao's Communist Revolution and
the ongoing Sri Lankan Revolution.
In the first instance, the conceptual basis for Mao's revolutionary martyrs can be
traced to a brutal peasant uprising which lasted from 1851-1864 CE in China. The
Taiping Rebellion, as it is known, claimed some 20 million Chinese during its fourteen
21
In a recent political pamphlet published by the Tamil Tigers, the organization
mentions two of its most famous martyrs - Arulnathan and Lieutenant Aseer. See AS.
Balasingham, "Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle," Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam . Publication Number 4, 1983, p. 34.
22
It is prudent at this point in the thesis to distinguish millenananism and messianism.
Millenarianism is the belief in the coming Millenium and as stated earlier in this paper has
been adopted by all secular revolutionary ideologies. Messianism, however, is the belief that
a divine human figure, the Messiah, will come to lead a community toward the Millenium
The distinction, although subtle, centers around necessity of one individual's extraordinary and
supernatural powers to enact the miraculous.
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years.
23 Driven by promises of agrarian reform and achieving momentum by mobilizing
a massive peasant army, the Taiping Rebellion has been characterized as the antecedent
to the Communist Revolution. 24 More importantly, however, it set the seeds for a
messianic conditioning in China and hence the adoption of martyrs by the Chinese
Communists. Author Cnsitiano Grottanelli notes that Baptist preachers from the United
States were responsible for the millenanan expectation and messianic nature of the
Taiping Rebellion. 25 Led by a converted Chinese Baptist named Hung Hsiu-ch'uaun,
millions of Hakka and Miao clans from southern China formed the first armies of the
Taipings. The Taipings, believing their leader Hung was the younger brother of Jesus
Christ,
26 fought valiantly in scores of battles throughout China. The subsequent martyr-
like fate of Hung was sealed when he met an early death by committing suicide after his
final defeat in battle. Thus, it is my contention that the martyrs from the Chinese
Revolution, while clearly not emanating from a monotheistic culture, resulted from the
messianic cultural conditioning of the Taipings.
Like the Chinese Revolution, the adoption of revolutionary martyrs in Sri Lanka,
particularly by the Tamil Eelam Tigers, has been contingent upon previous conditioning
23Dunn, p. 80.
24 Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of
Revolutionary China 1937-1945
.
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 15-17.
"Grottanelli, pp. 31-32.
26
It is also believed that Hung contributed to the belief that he was a messiah. His
frequent epileptic seizures convinced millions of his peasant followers that he was being
touched by God. For an account of his unusual behavior see Johnson, "Revolutionary
Change,"pp. 80-81.
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by messianic ideologies external to the country. In this case British Anglican priests were
the responsible for conditioning the Tamils toward messianism and martyrs. Colonized
by Portugal, Holland and Britain, Sri Lanka had been dominated by European colonial
powers for more than four centuries. It was the British, however, that annexed two
separate kingdoms - Tamil and Sinhala - to form the state of Sri Lanka. Ethnic and
religious antagonism between the two former kingdoms solidified as the British provided
the Hindu Tamils with a more than adequate share of power within the administration
over the Buddhist Singhala. 27 The Tamil elites, those who held the highest positions
within the colonial state administration, were courted by the Anglican missionaries in the
country and more than a few converted to Christianity. :8 It is my contention that this
sparked the adoption of messianism and, in turn, martyrs by today's militant Tamils.
Messianic cultural conditioning, however, defies the prevailing logic concerning ethnic
conflict. Both the Chinese and Sri Lankan Revolutions were rooted in nationalistic
overtones. Hence, one might contend that ardent nationalist revolutionaries would be
prone to reject any foreign influences Again, I assert that this prevailing logic is also
over-simplified Let us look instead to social psychological theory for a better
explanation of the phenomenon.
21As has been the case in most British colonies in Asia, certain ethnic groups were
singled out to carry out administrative functions, while others were categorized into different
occupational groupings. In this case, the Tamils were the obvious choice for the native
administrative class in Sri Lanka, having immigrated from a previously colonized India and
being more familiar with the British administration system. See Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic
Soldiers. State Security in Divided Societies , (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980), pp.
23-49.
' eBalasingham, p. 7
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One theory first put forth by author Rene Girard - mimetic desire - sought to account
for the perpetual rituals of sacrifice and other forms of religious violence throughout
primitive and modern cultures. But it also clearly explains the recent urge of non-
monotheistic cultures to incorporate martyrs within their revolutionary struggles. Mimetic
desire describes man's innate drive to obtain the same objects or desires as his rival. The
ever competitive Mao not only sought for the unification of his nation under communism
but he strove to shake off the domination of outside powers and show to the world that
China had finally come of age as a nation. What better way to join the club of elite
nations than to sport its own martyred icons just as the French, English and Americans
had nearly two centuries before?
Similarly, it is my contention that the Tamils are pursuing much the same course as
had the Chinese Communists. The Tiger martyrs are just as important to the Hindu
Tamils as Anglican martyrs had been for the British. They are in fact communal badges
of identification which legitimate a nation striving for independence and recognition,
equating to if not rivalling the status of the United Kingdom as a sovereign. Whether
rooted to Hinduism or not, the martyrs of the Tamil Tigers are a desired prize that these
revolutionaries are not easily willing to give up.
The last sufficient condition for the creation of martyrs is termed the associational
catalyst. This term refers to the metaphorical suggestions and assertions, whether subtle
or overt, that elevate the martyr to a central, preeminent, and easily recognizable symbols.
Usually originating from the poet's pen, the writer's romantic story or the journalist's
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column, 29 the associational catalyst "provides the pattern of perception to which people
respond" 30 and contribute to the power of the symbol.
Associational catalysts, themselves a metaphor invoking the image of chemical
reactions, are dependent upon certain conducive conditions. It is one thing to suggest that
a hero or a patriot is a martyr, it is quite another for a community to perceive it as true.
Therefore, the metaphor inherent in associational catalysts requires that it's author must
maintain a degree of social legitimacy so as to invoke a believable image This can be
increasingly difficult in revolution, as institutions are questioned, but not impossible
Next, there must be some media access (printing presses, radio, television, posters, etc.)
to ensure the continuation of the metaphor As authorities clamp down on revolutionary
agents and their propaganda, this may again pose problems However, even word of
mouth can spread a metaphor, so it is near impossible for an authority to entirely shut
down the media access necessary for associational catalysts
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Up to this point I have analyzed martyrs using a contingency approach - that is to say
we have determined that its image is dependent upon both necessary and sufficient
conditions. From this perspective, I have shown that martyrs, like heroes and patriots, are
29
I offer one particular example as evidence: During the Spanish Civil War, romantic
poets, novelists, journalists, and even filmmakers created a panapoly of revolutionary martyrs.
Most notable among these creative artists were W. H. Auden, Ernest Hemingway, C. Day
Lewis, Andre Malraux, George Orwell, and Gustav Regler. See Frederick R. Benson, Writers
in Arms: The Literary Impact of the Spanish Civil War , (New York: New York University
Press, 1967), pp. 1-305.
Edelman, p 67.
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first dependent upon social ebullience, the socio-psychological impulse to personify
symbols, and audiences to communicate their meaning. Next, we distinguished martyrs
from their two cousins by concluding that the Sacred "X" Factors of cultural messianic
conditioning and associational catalyst elevates them to positions of greater symbolic





This symbolic power is such that revolutionary martyrs cannot be subjected to
empirical premises of disproof. Thus, they are more apt to be accepted as true even
without substantive proof. As symbols they also "create," as Murray Edelman suggests,




IV. THE REVOLUTIONARY MARTYRS PARADIGMATIC
PROPORTIONALITY
George Bernard Shaw commented in his book, The Devil's Disciple , that:
"Martyrdom ... [is] the only way a man can become famous without ability." Truly, over
time many once-martyred revolutionaries are subsequently dismissed as mere failures.
These martyrs lose the ability to incite emotive responses from previously loyal
constituencies. Whether discredited by some previously unknown moral impropriety,
failed by an all but extinct political ideology, or merely forgotten in a sea of fallen
comrades, the individual symbol no longer serves as an effective tool of persuasion.
Some lose their effectiveness almost overnight Other revolutionary martyrs fade away
within a generation or so Such has definitely been the case with the Nazi pantheon of
martyrs earlier this century. As soon as the victorious allied armies occupied Germany
after World War II, most all traces of Nazi martyr memorials had been erased from the
annals of German culture However, still other martyrs in revolution never lose their
powers to persuade individuals to support their political causes and adopt violence as a
means to change society
This leads us to explore one obvious question - How can we determine whether one
movement's martyr will possess an effective ability to persuade others to adopt a
revolutionary cause and incite action? Previously I maintained that revolutionary martyrs,
constructs of the human psyche, are beyond the realm of empirical measurement. This is
57
not to say, however, that through analytical comparison we can not uncover one martyr's
proportional strength over another. In the pages that follow, I assert that a revolutionary
martyr's effective strength is dependent upon two factors. First, socio-political groups
must be able to pattern a martyr's sacrifice within the confines of a socially devised
charter of reality - a paradigmatic truth. These paradigmatic truths, especially as they
relate to martyrs, must be constructed along three social dimensions - truth perception,
credibility and legitimate authority.^ In succession, each dimension relates to and effects
the believability, plausibility, and preexisting social identities and sentiments. 2 As each
social dimension is increased, the greater the likelihood that the revolutionary martyr's
symbol will be accepted as truthful When, however, each social dimension is
maximized, the martyr becomes a symbol beyond reproach and is accepted as an ultimate
reality
Once revolutionary martyrs attain the status of a social paradigm, their images become
powerful symbols which catalyze zealous action. Moreover, revolutionary martyrs can
"In his definitive work on the subject of social realities, historian, sociologist, and
author Bruce Lincoln, contends that myths are created in much the same manner. Most social
myths follow a three dimension construction process of truth-claims, credibility, and authority
I have taken the academic liberty of modifying Lincoln's original model to accommodate for
revolutionary martyrs as they become woven into a social group's charter of reality. See
Lincoln, "Discourse," p. 23-26.
2U.S. Army doctrine has recognized the importance of exploiting pre-existing social
beliefs and habits when planning psychological operations missions both for allies and against
enemies. A recent U.S. Army publication advises psychological operators to "capitalize on
existing habits" because target audiences "more readily believe and follow information and
directives" that they have previously been accustomed to. U.S. Department of the Army,
Psychological Operations , Field Manual 33-1, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1990), p. 3-7.
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become destabilizing elements if left uncontrolled 3 Thus, if they are to be truly effective
revolutionary martyrs must be subjected to rigorous bureaucratic controls. These controls
are most effective when fluctuating from strategies which avow action to alternate
strategies which proclaim a more passive orientation. Action oriented strategies provoke
individuals to act in the name of a fallen comrade, avenging his death against an
authority. These strategies demand violent, aggressive behavior and often offer the
promise of consequential martyrdom A
But alone these strategies accomplish little more than organizational destruction, as
hundreds or even thousands of revolutionaries, often ill-prepared and ill-trained, set out
to challenge and confront the authority in power. Coupled, however, with somewhat more
passive strategies to bolster recruitment and enhance socialization processes, such as the
incorporation of ritualistic practices and ceremonies, martyrs can also compliment
revolutionary political activities These two differing strategies enable revolutionary
groups sufficient freedom to manipulate martyrs throughout the course of their struggle.
This organizational freedom can therefore create an unlimited set of options for the
propagandist, which often forces the authority into a reactive and defensive posture
These two factors - the construction of social dimensions for paradigmatic truths and
3For a brief illustration see my summary of the early Jewish martyrs in Chapter II.
Also Mircea Eliade adds, " Martyrdom, a harbinger of an uprising, is also a temporary
alternative to it. A community must control its martyrs as it controls its military zealots...The
loss of such control among the Judean provincials during the latter part of the first century
BCE was fatal for Jewish autonomy and nearly fatal for Jewry as a whole." Eliade,
"Encyclopedia,"p. 235.
Previously addressed in Chapter II; Consequential martyrs are usually the products of
mass martyring operations.
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bureaucratic controls - with regards to revolutionary martyrs help explain why some can
endure the test of time and others fail. The following sections presented in this chapter
explain each of these factors. In so doing we will examine three cases of revolutionary
martyrs and describe how these factors were either ignored or embraced by the
revolutionary movement. Finally, we will determine which martyr of the three was
proportionally more effective than the others and why.
A. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PARADIGMATIC MARTYRS
The first dimension in the construction of a social paradigm - truth perception -
concerns the initial inclination of a society to believe a claim as reliable or accurate.
With regard to martyrdom, the manner surrounding a revolutionary's death provides us
with an initial "litmus test" of truth perception. In particular, we should determine if the
martyr is truly perceived as being a victim of a tyrannical power or whether his death is
regarded as a concocted ploy to gain sympathy? Author Mircea Eliade writes that "a
martyr is often a model for lesser forms of martyrdom ..." and that "suicide, being self
inflicted, is rarely accepted ..."
5
Thus, if we were to develop a scale of truth perception
at the lesser end would lie suicide and at the greater end would lie unjust murder. If
society perceives that a martyred revolutionary was himself responsible for his own death,
then his subsequent martyrdom will be degraded. If, however, society perceives that he
was wrongfully tricked into his fateful end, his martyrdom will be esteemed and held up




The next dimension - credibility - concerns the social impulse of groups to embrace
something as being highly plausible. In reference to martyrdom, credibility is established
by how well one adheres to what I have labelled the "ideal revolutionary martyr profile." 7
The first ideal characteristic involves the sex of the revolutionary martyr. In each and
every revolutionary group which embraced martyrs as political tools of propaganda, the
paradigmatic martyred exemplar was male. 8 This should be of no surprise to sociological
scholars. Truly, most martyrs are the products of western society and these societies are
predominantly patriarchal Hence, the martyred revolutionary serves as a father-figure,
guiding his rebellious children toward a better future. Also, women just do not figure
prominently in revolutionary organizations. Even in the most current revolutionary
movements, those of the 1970s and beyond, women have comprised at most, thirty
6
Ibid, p 231.
After an in-depth study of 20 revolutionary martyrs, I constructed a database of the
personal characteristics and social environment surrounding the these martyrs. Using a multi
variable deduction, nine variables in particular were chosen as the most influential in this
sample. This data can be found in Appendix B, Table 2 - Revolutionary Martyrs: A
Database.
8As with any rule,there are exceptions. I have discovered a recent paradoxical effort
to create female revolutionary martyrs in the Sendero Luminso movement in Peru. Among
these are - Janet Talavera and Edith Lagos. Although Peru is divided along ethnic lines
(European descendants, mestizos, and Indians), each ethnic group retains a highly patriarchal
social system. Indeed the impetus behind the creation of female martyrs is not coming from
inside Peru. Rather, their suggestive catalysts, originating primarily from American and
European Maoist supporters, have developed these female icons to engender support from the
feminist communities in both the U.S. and in Europe. See Revolution in Peru , (Berkeley: The
Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, 1985, pp 24-27), "International Women's Day",
a poster; Luis Arce Borja, "Janet is winning battles from beyond the grave," El Diario
International
. May 1992, pp 89, "Janet Talavera continues to win battles long after her
death", El Diario Internacional, May 1993, p 14.
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percent of all members 9
The second ideal characteristic of revolutionary martyrdom regards age.
Revolutionary martyrs must die at a young age. If they die at an advanced age, society
tends to mitigate the effect of their death. We are all familiar with such rationalized,
although meant as consoling, comments after an aged loved one passes away - "You must
be thankful that he lived to a ripe old age before he left you," or "He certainly lived life
to its fullest." The same is true with fallen revolutionary martyrs. Only youthful
exemplars will engender an endearing sympathy from society. Thus, for the purpose of
this discourse I have set the boundary of youth as forty years old or less.
Next, the revolutionary martyr must serve to divide society into two sides - one good
and the other evil. Hence, if the martyr suffered at the hands of a particular agent
representing one social group, that entire group can be labelled as the "side of tyranny"
while the martyr's community can be perceived as the "side of the oppressed."
Detentions, trials, or executions ordered by some agent of authority (judicial, military, or
otherwise) serve as indicators for this division. One social group can therefore be
specifically held responsible for the martyr's death and ergo blame can be brought to bear
on that particular group.
Another ideal characteristic of a revolutionary martyr is that he must have been
associated with some type of passive occupation prior to taking up arms for the
9Maria Jose Moyano, "Personal Remarks Concerning Membership in Revolutionary
Organizations," Naval Postgraduate School, 4 April 1994. Professor Moyano is a noted
scholar on political violence. She has spoken on and taught a variety of courses concerning
this topic at both the University of Vermont and Naval Postgraduate School.
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revolutionary cause. This signifies that he is not, as his rivals are, inherently violent or
evil. Instead, a martyr's subsequent adoption of violence could be judged as having been
caused by a preceding tyrannical power and that his actions were merely necessary to
correct a social injustice.
Fifth, the ideal revolutionary martyr must have exuded leadership qualities while alive.
The leader distinction grants a certain degree of fame and notoriety in life but also serves
as a harbinger for future honor and glory in death. His image will no doubt be singled
out by his surviving followers from the other fallen comrades within the movement
Next, the revolutionary martyr must have been either a powerful speaker, or a great
writer. These personal skills can serve as the basis for subsequent and continual use of
his image by the group. Re-enacted or reprinted speeches and writings are a constant
reminder to his followers that while he is gone, his ideas remain. It also adds to a
supernatural illusion that his persona is omnipresent, forever watching and guiding the
movement toward victory'
The seventh ideal revolutionary martyr characteristic is that he should be celibate.
Symbolizing an extreme commitment to the revolutionary cause, this ascetic attitude has
been a much celebrated and necessary lifestyle particularly for priests and nuns in the
Roman Catholic Church. Celibacy, however, is extremely difficult to prove or to likewise
disprove. Thus, revolutionary groups may instead rely on affirming their exemplar's
bachelorhood to signify a devotion and commitment to their ideology. 10
10Celibacy in certain cultures is not as important as it is in others. For example in
Islamic societies, Muhammed the Prophet, was a polygamist and produced children with a
number of his wives. Thus, in these societies the trait of celibacy is overshadowed by man's
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Revolutionary martyr's must also have predicted their own demise. A verifiable
premonition of death convinces an audience that what the martyr has said will ultimately
come true. He knows what the future will bring. Through association this omen can also
lend merit to the prophecies of the inevitable victory and the coming millennium. Finally,
a revolutionary martyr must be well educated. Having attained some sort of verifiable
degree of education increases a perception that a martyr has mastered the knowledge of
worldly empirical disciplines in life. In death, it may follow, he can be relied upon to set
course toward the unseen and as yet unproven.
Again, this profile is a perfect ideal. It is very difficult indeed to find a revolutionary
exemplar which matches exactly each of these nine "saintly" qualities. Clearly, however,
those areas which revolutionary martyrs fall short are continually cited by groups
disputing their martyrdom as evidence to their human frailty. Take for instance the
revolutionary martyrdom of Ernesto "Che" Guevara. After his death, most Latin
American authorities tried to undermine his character, citing in particular his lewd sexual
lifestyle and ridiculing his failed strategy of the Focoist revolution. Therefore, while
Guevara's icon adorned the banners of student radical movements throughout the world,
his martyrdom was never fully embraced by other groups contending with tyrannical
powers. Instead, other national revolutionaries were chosen as paradigmatic martyrs.^ 1
responsibility to both women and children, as well as to God. We might therefore expect thai
in Islamic revolutionary movements, paradigmatic martyrs would not necessarily adhere to
this ideal.
nSuch was especially the case in Nicaragua where Sandino's martyrdom became
paramount to any other Latin American revolutionary. For an excellent synopsis of the
choice of his martyred image over other figures and its impact on the FSLN movement in
Nicaragua see David Nolan, FSLN: The ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan
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The final dimension - legitimate authority - completes the construction of a
paradigmatic truth Revolutionary martyrs that possess legitimate authority do so because
of their ability to invoke an ancestral link to an already accustomed social paradigm. 12
Legitimate authority neither recasts a new paradigm, nor does it modify pre-existing
paradigms. Instead, it reinforces those paradigms which already exist. Such was the case
in the panoply of national Christian saints, following in Christ's path. Such is still the
case with revolutionary martyrs today
Thus, a revolutionary martyr's paradigmatic proportionality can be aptly traced along
three dimensions. Along the x-axis we can show a relative scale of the truth perception
concerning the manner of a martyr's death A perceived suicide would register an
insignificant value and a murder would register a substantial value. Along the y-axis we
can determine nine incremental values for each corresponding adherence to the credibility
of the ideal martyr profile, thus giving the martyr an increased "area" of proportional
strength. Finally, along the z-axis we must research the extent that a martyr's image
invokes legitimate authority by establishing a strong ancestral link to a preexisting social
charter of reality. If present this will allow us to relate the martyr's proportional strength
as a "volumetric" cube as Figure 3 illustrates on the next page
Revolution
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(Coral Gables: Institute of InterAmencan Studies, 1988), pp. 16-18.
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In the following section I will test this paradigmatic dimensional model using three cases
of revolutionary martyrs - Hunger striker, Bobby Sands of the Provisional IRA, Philippine
Nationalist, Jose Rizal, and Amal Shi'a Cleric, Imam Musa al Sadr. In each case we will
determine each social dimension of paradigmatic proportionality. Finally, we will
examine whether each revolutionary martyr has the inherent ability to influence his
constituency in the years to come.
B. THE MARTYRDOM OF ROBERT "BOBBY" SANDS
Robert "Bobby" Sands was born in Belfast Northern Ireland in 1954. He was the
eldest of four children from an Irish Catholic family. From the onset, Sands showed "no
special gifts, he did not stand out, shine at school, show special leadership qualities, [or]
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do anything that would attract anything more than passing attention." 1 But by the early
1970's, his once peaceful predominantly Protestant neighborhood in Rathcoole, Belfast
was torn apart by political violence It was this chaos which would eventually thrust
Sands into the world's spotlight
Victimized by a campaign by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), a Protestant
paramilitary organization, to harass Catholic families into leaving their estates. Sands'
otherwise happy and uneventful adolescence in Rathcoole soon ended. Author Padraig
O'Malley writes:
Following the introduction of internment in August 1971, intimidation of Catholics
became an everyday occurrence and the situation grew steadily worse there in absence
of adequate protection by either the police or the army The collapse of communal
order was increasingly evident...Because there was an inadequate police presence,
intimidation went unchallenged Families sat up late into the night, tuned into the
police channel to find out exactly where the mob was, which street they were heading
toward, waiting for the anonymous fire bombs that would come hurling through the
window "
Eventually, this violence succeeded in pushing the Sands family out of Rathcoole. Sands'
sister, Bernadette, stated "It ended up when everything erupted that the friends [Sands]
went about with for years were the same ones who joined the [UDA] ...
,
pointed him out
and got him beaten." 1
By June 1972, having lived with the constant threat of Protestant violence, Sands
now eighteen years old, joined the IRA He said, "I had seen too many homes
-
'Padraig O'Malley, Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of
Despair. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), p. 38.
:<
Ibid, p. 42.
::As cited in Ibid, p. 42.
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wrecked, fathers and sons arrested, neighbors hurt, [and] friends murdered." 16 Within
six months he was arrested for the first time on a weapons charge and imprisoned for
three and half years Up to this time Sands' Republican allegiance was visceral; in
prison he learned to rationalize it.
A personal student of future Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams, Sands learned to
speak Gaelic, he read the poetry of Irishman Eithne Carbery and he studied the
revolutionary writings of Guevara, Fanon, and Torres. He quickly became well versed
in the history and politics of Irish Republican despair. 17 By the time of his release,
Sands was a well-versed and well-trained political revolutionary. 18
Six months after his release, however, Sands was arrested again, charged for
possession of a handgun and sentenced this time to fourteen years in the Maze/Long Kesh
prison. It was here that Sands gained the notoriety that he failed to achieve before.
Claiming that he was subjected to the most severe forms of psychological and physical
torture, Sands wrote:
I scratched my name and not for fame
upon the whitened wall,
Bobby Sands was here, I wrote with fear
In awful shaky scrawl.
I wrote it low where eyes don't go
Twas but to testify,
That I was sane and not to blame
16John M. Feehan, Bobby Sands and the Tragedy of Northern Ireland
.
(Dublin: The
Mercier Press, 1983), pp. 75-76.
17 0'Malley, p. 45.
18Feehan, pp. 86-87.
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Should here I come to die. 19
But it was not Sands literary prowess alone that etched a place in history for him. His
"fame" was sealed by his prison group's hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981.
Hunger strikes had been embraced by the Irish Republican Army prisoners at least as
far back as the 1920's. :o By 1972, however, the hunger strike had become a prominent
strategy within the IRA's continued resistance against British occupation. Author Jack
Holland writes:
In May of that year a group of Provisionals led by ex-Belfast commanding officer
Billy McKee, who had been convicted of an arms charge, won recognition as political
prisoners from a beleaguered British administration. The concessions, which were
granted after a hunger strike, included the right to free association., the right to wear
their own clothes... and the right to refuse to do prison work. It was an implicit
recognition from the Conservative government that they were dealing with a
powerfully motivated political movement. 21
By the mid 1970's, however, convicted IRA members were no longer granted special
prisoner of war status by the British authorities. Instead, a new policy of
"criminalization" was adopted This policy dispelled the "special category" status of IRA
members. From 1976 on, "anyone convicted would be treated as an ordinary criminal
..." "jailed in newly constructed prison facilities. " and housed "in eight-by-twelve foot
19As cited in Ibid, p. 90.
20O' Malley, p. 26. Also, former IRA leader Sean MacStiofain explains that hunger
strikes were particularly embraced by IRA inmates as a form of civil disobedience to protest
British persecutions of other revolutionaries in the 1950s as well - in this case Greek EOKA
resistance fighters. "Whenever word of such an execution came in, they had a practice of
going on hunger strike for forty-eight hours." Sean MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary ,
(Great Britain: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), p. 77.
'Jack Holland, Too Long a Sacrifice: Life and Death in Northern Ireland since 1969
,




By 1980, this new policy although known by new phraseology, led to the same results
- harsh often brutal treatment of IRA prisoners. Sands describes some of the torture he
endured himself:
I was brought down the stairs into the interrogation building again. This interrogation
lasted about two hours and was followed by another which lasted two hours. During
both of these I was slapped, punched, threatened etc ... After dinner at about 3:00 p.m.
I was taken to the last room of the interrogation building ... I was set upon by two
detectives. I was punched very heavily across the head, ears, face and eyes. I was
kicked in the legs My head was smashed against a wooden wall ... After this beating
I was told to set down .... I was given a cigarette as if nothing had happened ,... 23
This maltreatment also documented by the European Commission of Human Rights and
Amnesty International, led the Long Kesh prisoners in cell block H to re-adopt McKee's
once successful strategy of protest.
By October 1980, after a series of efforts to engage British authorities in negotiations
to prevent the continued policies in Maze/Long Kesh prison failed, seven Republican
prisoners started a hunger strike. By mid December, these seven prisoners and twenty-
three others that followed them were duped into believing that their demands had been
met and the strike was called off 2
"4
Less than three months later, with a renewed resolve
22™O'Malley, pp. 19-20.
23As cited in Feehan, p. 93.
24Brendan Hughes, a Maze hunger striker in charge of interfacing with officials from
the Northern Ireland Office - the intermediary between the IRA and the British Cabinet - was
led to believe that a settlement proposal was on its way. It was not. Hughes, however, acted
in the belief that a settlement was on its way and called off the strike. Later, to save face the
hunger strikers reported that they honored an appeal from Cardinal O'Fiaich to end their
protest. See O'Malley, pp. 30-33.
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a new strike was called. On 5 May 1981, this strike claimed its first victim - Bobby
Sands. Nine more prisoners died and still their demands were ignored
Martyrdom has long played a role in the IRA Author Jack Holland explains:
The motif of martyrdom runs through the IRA tradition as strongly as the theme of
victory does in the annals of loyalism. It gilds violent death with a layer of
sentimentality that disguises its ugliness, its brutality. To sacrifice oneself and others
for the cause of Ireland becomes a hallowed act untouched by violence's sordid
reality.
25
Although no one can deny that Bobby Sands sacrificed his life to the cause of the Irish
Republic, the manner in which he did so challenged the very principals that Republicans
embraced. Sands' martyrdom while declared almost immediately 20 would prove to be a
very contentious and a divisive force even within his own community.
When we attempt to analyze Sands martyrdom in the context of our paradigmatic
model of effectiveness, we can see just how limited the breadth of its reach was First,
Sands' manner of death could and was easily construed as suicidal. Not only was this
opinion endorsed by the British, 27 but it was also maintained by some Irish Catholic
"Holland, pp 57-58.
26For a description of the IRA's efforts to martyr Sands in art, literature, and ritual see
O'Malley, pp. 117-120 and pp. 157-159
27Padraig O'Malley reports that British dailies "succinctly expressed the British view
[concerning Sands death]. Sands ... 'committed suicide in the full knowledge of what he was
doing and determined to reject all initiatives designed to save his life. He was not hounded to
death. He was not in prison for his beliefs but for proven serious criminal offenses. He was
not being oppressed or ill treated. There was only one killer of Bobby Sands and that was
Bobby Sands himself.'" Cited in Ibid, p. 201
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authorities. 28 Father Denis O'Callaghan pointed to the immoral
designs of the hunger strikers as early as June 1981, stating: "one cannot ignore the
general consequences which will follow on one's action, because one is responsible for
the full foreseeable consequences of what one does." This led him to conclude that
Sands' manner of death was morally unjustifiable. 29 In fact, even before the Maze/Long
Kesh contingent of hunger strikers set out on their self destructive course their plans were
immediately criticized on "tactical", "strategical", "physical", and "moral" grounds, by
their own IRA comrades. 30 Clearly, the truth perception concerning Sands' martyrdom
was, at best, limited from the onset.
Sands' personal traits and conditions surrounding his martyrdom did, however,
establish a plausible level of credibility. When analyzing his profile in relation to the
ideal revolutionary martyr, he meets seven of the nine criteria. 31 Sands falls short only
in the areas of celibacy and intelligence. Sands married his childhood sweetheart and this
wedlock produced one child, a boy named Gerard. By 1976, however, his marriage had
/8
"Cardinal Basil Hume, Catholic archbishop of Westminster, called the hunger strikes
"a form of violence, violence to the hunger strikers themselves' that 'could not be condoned
by the Church as being in accordance with God's will for men.' Sands' death, he said, was
suicide, as was 'any hunger striker's death that [included] with it the intention to die.'" In any
case the division within the Catholic Church over the question of hunger strikers' deaths being
suicides was "more defined" than every before. As cited in Ibid, p. 174 and pp. 176-177.
29As cited in Ibid, p. 188.
30When Sands wrote to Gerry Adams, then Vice-President of Sinn Fein, about plans
for a hunger strike, he believed the Provisional IRA would fully support their operations.
Surprisingly, Adams responded, '"...we are tactically, strategically, physically and morally
opposed to a hunger strike."' As cited in Feehan, p. 109.
31 See Appendix B, Table 2.
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failed and his wife subsequently moved to England This served to rebuke and embarrass
Bobby's personal drives toward Northern Ireland nationalism. Secondly, Sands'
intelligence, although claimed by IRA propaganda documents, could never be adequately
proven. Although his political indoctrination left Sands with an improved education it
was nonetheless one sided. One glaring fact also remained - he quit school at the age of
fifteen. Thus, Sands could never claim to have a breadth of knowledge so typical of other
revolutionary martyrs
Finally, Sands' martyred image was extremely difficult to legitimately establish any
firm ancestral ties to the Irish Republican cause. First, his family surname did not match
any previous IRA hero's nor did it sound particularly Irish Catholic. 32 Second, Sands
grew up in predominantly Protestant neighborhoods and while in school had befriended
a number of Anglican youths Third, after his passing, allegations spread quickly that
Sands was not the Irish Catholic exemplar he was originally made out to be. Sands'
father, it was revealed, was Protestant
33
Finally, his entire movement within the
Maze/Long Kesh Prison was discredited by Sinn Fein and the IRA, writ large.
Subsequent efforts to restore any semblance of legitimate tie to him after the fact have
been labelled as mere acts of equivocation. 34
32 0'Malley, p. 37.
3JAs reported by the BBC in a television program titled "Old Scores." Others
claimed that Sands' paternal grandfather was Protestant. Still others dismissed these reports
entirely. Nonetheless, Author Padraig O'Malley admits "having the leftovers of an inherited
Protestant mentality, the residue of Protestant genes somewhere in the bloodlines, " indelibly




Thus, Bobby Sands martyrdom has become somewhat less spectacular than one might
think As Figure 3A shows below , when using the paradigmatic proportionality model,













Thirteen years after his death, Sands' name is little more than a faint reminder of a failed
policy of a few Irish Catholic prisoners Instead, the Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland
continue to embrace heroes of a distant past as their martyred paradigms. 35
C. THE MARTYRDOM OF JOSE RIZAL
Our next case study concerns Philippine nationalist, Jose Rizal Born in the province
of Laguna in 1861, Rizal was the seventh of eleven children. His family was Chinese
mestizo with a bloodline that consisted also of Spanish and native Filipino ancestry. As
3:As of the time of this writing, Hollywood plans on filming a autobiographical movie
concerning the life of Michael Collins, martyred leader of the IRB and Easter Uprising.
Rumors have circulated that heartthrob Kevin Costner will play the leading role.
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a youngster Jose excelled in his studies, especially history and religion. 36 His mother -
Teodora Alonso - was largely responsible for his yearning for knowledge, often reading
to him and quizzing him about his academic work. Author Austin Coates notes that
Teodora's and Jose's relationship was strengthened by bonds of love and understanding
stating: "Between mother and son there was a close affinity" 37 that didn't exist in the same
degree with her other children. By 1868, however, events in the Philippines would
forever impact upon Jose's once tranquil adolescence
The Philippines, a colony of Spain for more than two hundred years, was "less
obviously rich than the American colonies," but was nonetheless "subjected] to the same
intermittently profitable exploitation ,.." 38 as the rest of Spain's colonial possessions had
been. Throughout this period of colonialism, native Filipinos were treated as little more
than slaves. In fact, "in their dealings with the [native Filipinos] ..." the Spanish officials
"were inclined to be domineering, arrogant, insolent, and contemptuous." 39
After Queen Isabella had been deposed in October 1868 and the Spanish Liberals had
taken power, the Filipinos lot had improved considerably. Soon thereafter, a fervent
democratic spirit embraced by Philippine Governor Carlos Ma. de la Torre quickly
36Possibly a prophesy in the making, Rizal was especially fond of the tales of the early
Christian martyrs. See Austin Coates, Rizal: Philippine Nationalist and Martyr , (Hong Kong:
Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 16.
37
Ibid, p. 14.
38Frank Gibnev. The Pacific Century: America and Asia in a Changing World
.
(New
York: Charles Scnbner's Sons, 1992), p. 33.
39Nicholas Zafra, Jose Rizal: Historical Studies , (Quezon City: University of
Philippines Press, 1977), p. 25.
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engulfed the Philippines. 40 Yet, this spirit was short lived as the Spanish Liberals,
suspicious of de la Torre's reforms, recalled him from the islands and installed the
despotic Rafael de Izquierda as the new governor. The change of administration was
immediately felt by the Filipinos. Author Austin Coates notes: "From the enthusiastic
optimism of de la Torre's governorship, Filipino intellectuals passed into a mood of
disillusion,"
41
well founded and substantiated by the renewed oppression of the Spanish
bureaucrats controlled by de Izquierda.
Describing the conditions during de Izquierda's regime, Jose Rizal wrote:
I spent many, many hours of my childhood down on the shore of the lake, Laguna de
Bay. I was thinking of what was beyond, I was dreaming of what might be over the
other side of the waves. Almost everyday, in our town, we saw the Guardia Civil
lieutenant caning and injuring some unarmed and inagressive villagers. The villager's
only fault was that while at distance he had not taken off his hat and made his bow.
The alcalde treated the poor villagers in the same way whenever he visited us. 42
Soon these acts of brutality were to directly impact upon the Rizal family. At the age of
ten, Jose's mother foolishly took sides in a family squabble, which left her in the end
accused of a capital offense. The Spanish authorities subsequently arrested her,
humiliated her and the family, and subjected her to physical punishment for more than
two and one-half years. 43 From this point on, Jose learned what it was like to personally
40
"The new government sent as governor ... Carlos Ma. de la Torre. The new
governor brought to the Philippines ... the liberal and democratic spirit of the Revolution of
1868. He did away with the censorship of the press and the ban on the holding of public
demonstrations. He displayed a friendly and cordial attitude toward the inhabitants of the
Philippines." Ibid, p. 15.
4 Coates, p. 29.




live under the sword of the Spanish Guardia Civil
One other event that was to have an enormous influence upon Rizal was the Cavite
Affair of 1872. Tired of de Izquierda's tyranny, native Filipino soldiers mutinied against
their Spanish officers at the Cavite military arsenal on the shores of Manila Bay The
Spanish authorities claimed at the time that this was indicative of a widespread conspiracy
to overthrow the colonial government in the Philippines. 44 Thousands of alleged Filipino
conspirators were executed, imprisoned or exiled for their supposed roles in this mutiny.
Included among these were three Filipino Catholic clergymen, Fathers Jose Burgos,
Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora 4> The execution of Father Burgos, personal tutor
of Jose's eldest brother - Paciano, had a pronounced affect upon Rizal. He wrote: "In the
face of those injustices and cruelties, my youthful imagination was aroused and I swore
to avenge some day those numberless persons who suffered from them." 46
During the next twenty years, Rizal travelled abroad to pursue his studies. By 1886
he had attained degrees in medicine and philosophy from the University of Madrid. More
importantly, however, his travels aroused the great spirit of nationalism within him. It
was also during this time in Europe that he wrote and published a novel, Noli Me
Tdngere . In it he described "the social conditions, the livelihood, the beliefs, the hopes,
the vices, the complaints, the grievances of ... [the Filipino] people. . unmask[ing] the
hypocrisy, which under the cloak of religion, came to [the] country to impoverish ...
44 Coates, p. 28
45 All three priests were accused of masterminding the affair, tried by a military court,




[and] brutalize ... [Filipinos] " 47 Rizal was immediately branded a subversive by the
Spanish officials. In spite of this, he continued to stir and incite Filipinos to action while
overseas, so it was not surprising that when he returned to the islands in 1892, he was
promptly exiled to Mindanao
On the day of his exile, a band of young Filipino rebels inspired by Rizal's writings
and led by Andres Bonifacio formed the Katipunan armed revolutionary movement.
Although Rizal was to have no active part in the armed uprising for independence which
lasted nearly three decades, he was later brought back to Manila, tried by the Spanish
authorities and shot by a Guardia Civil firing squad. Subsequently, Rizal became the
"Tagalog Christ." 48 Author Austin Coates states that:
... the parallel between the two lives is inescapable in the impression each conveys of
a man sent into the world to fulfill a purpose for which he was aware that everything
must be sacrificed, as also he was aware that it might be required of him to be killed
as part of that purpose. Many men receive intimations of their future, and other lives
may equally have resembled that of Christ, martyrdoms have numerous similarities.
What is unique in Rizal's life is the mass of written evidence demonstrating this aspect
of it. 49
Indeed, this documented parallel contributes greatly to the effective strength of Rizal's
image for most Filipinos to this day.
An examination of Rizal's martyrdom clearly reveals a broadened proportional
paradigm. With regard to our first dimension - truth perception - it was easy to see that
the circumstances surrounding Rizal's death could easily be construed as a murder plot.
47
Rizal as cited in Ibid, p. 36.




At his trial all evidence was presented in the form of sworn written testimonies, with no
personal witnesses being allowed to testify before the military tribunal. Also no rebuttals
to these statements were allowed. Years later, it became apparent that the Spaniards
"wanted only blood" 50 to avenge the revolutionary insurrection by Bonifacio. 51 Unlike
Sands, Rizal's image could thus remain highly resistant to charges and accusations over
a self-inflicted death.
Secondly, Rizal's credibility as a martyr is not only plausible but so nearly saint-like
as to be uncanny He meets all nine criteria of the ideal revolutionary martyr profile. 52
Particularly noteworthy was Rizal's unwavering heroism in the face of death On the
night before his scheduled execution, he composed Ultimo Adios - his last poem - to his
family, friends, and countrymen. He wrote:
Farewell, my adored country, region beloved of the sun,
Pearl of the Orient Sea, our lost Eden
Departing in happiness, to you I give the sad, withered,
remains of my life,
And had it been a life more brilliant, more fine, more fulfilled,
Even so it is to you I would have given it, willingly to you. 53
Even moments before he was to be shot, Rizal requested that he die standing,
unblindfolded, and facing his executioners. The last of these three requests was denied
50
Ibid, p. 297.
51After Rizal's execution, one Spanish official - Ramon Blanco - admitted the haste
and injustice surrounding Rizal's sentencing saying that "he would never have condemned
Rizal to death." Later still he presented his sword and sash to the Rizal family as an
apologetic gesture for his role in the execution. See Ibid, p. 297.
"Again, see Appendix B, Table 2 - Revolutionary Martyrs: A Database.
"Rizal, Ultimo Adios as cited in Coates, p. 321.
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Traitors, the Spaniards thought, should always be shot in the back. 54
To paraphrase Rizal's words, it is in the last paradigmatic dimension - legitimate
authority - that his martyred image withers. Never a unified nation, the Philippines has
struggled to attain a sense of a national identity since its independence. Author Frank
Gibney notes that the Philippines has "no ancient sense of nationhood,""no pervasive
religion or any authority that range[s] beyond a few village kinship groups." 55 For these
reasons one can understand why the country has been undermined by internal strife for
decades. The son of a privileged Chinese mestizo and Roman Catholic family, Rizal's
image imparts only limited affective value beyond the privileged middle and upper classes
in Manila. To thousands within the impoverished classes and the predominantly muslim
population in Mindanao now struggling for independence against those in authority in
Manila, Rizal remains just a face on a statue or a name on a poem. Thus, Jose Rizal's
martyrdom has only a limited depth of legitimate authority.
While Jose Rizal's life and death is certainly worthy of honor and praise, his
martyrdom is frustratingly unfulfilled. Using our paradigmatic proportionality model,
shown as Figure 3B on the next page, Rizal fully satisfies the first two social dimensions












Yet, there is hope that Rizal's image can and will endure as a lasting symbol for at least
some Filipinos The discredidation of the malevolent Marcos regime, the subsequent
election of Corazon Aquino and removal of American forces from Philippine soil, and the
apparent weakening of subversive elements in the country has sparked a renewed belief
that the Philippines will realize its destiny as a nation Whether all Filipinos will come
to embrace Rizal as a national martyr, however, still remains questionable
D. THE MARTYRDOM OF MUSA AL SADR
Our last case study of revolutionary martyrdom involves the Shi'ite cleric of Lebanon,
the Imam Musa al Sadr Born in Qom, Iran in 1928 Musa al Sadr was the son of an alim,
a Shi'ite religious scholar Although Musa al Sadr's education initially followed a path
of purely secular endeavors by pursuing a degree in law, 56 Sayyid Abdul Hussein Sharif
:tFouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon
,
(Ithaca
Cornell University Press, 1986), p 42.
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al Din, 57 a relative and mufti of Tyre, Lebanon, persuaded him to complete his studies in
religion. Musa subsequently excelled throughout four years of religious training in Najaf,
Iraq, one of the most renown Shi'ite centers of learning. After Abdul Hussein passed
away in 1957, Musa al Sadr was invited to Tyre to become this Shi'ite community's new
mufti. It was here that Musa al Sadr initiated what was to be one of the most remarkable
political mobilization and revolutionary efforts in modern history.
For centuries the Lebanese Shi'a had been a deprived community. Under Ottoman
rule the Shi'a were directly controlled and manipulated by a landholding elite, the zu'ama.
These "political bosses" 58 extracted taxes from their clients in exchange for a variety of
social services. Often the delivery of these services went frustratingly unrealized. By the
time Musa al Sadr arrived in Tyre, however, it became obvious that Lebanese state
officials had done little to change what had become customary under the Ottomans.
Moreover, state institutions withheld access and denied privileges to Shi'a along social,
economic, and political lines.
Social advancement opportunities for Shi'a were often non existent, only half of whom
had any exposure to formal education avenues, while in comparison the state average
participation in academic institutions stood at seventy percent. 59 Political discrimination
was also evident. Shi'a, although the most populous sectarian affiliation, comprising
57A Sayyid is a Shi'a who claims descendency from the Prophet Muhammed. Like
Abdul Hussein al Din, Musa al Sadr was also a Sayyid, see Ibid, p. 42.
58Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon ,
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), p. 15.
59Joseph Chamie as cited in Norton, p. 163.
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almost one third of the country's citizens, by 1977, 60 only accounted for 19 of the 99 seats
within the confessional system of the National Assembly even by the 1980s. 61
Economically speaking, the Shi'ite community's status lagged far behind the national
average. In 1971, an average Shi'ite family earned 4,532 Lebanese pounds, more than 27
percent less than the Lebanese average family income. 62 Gradually Musa al Sadr
endeavored to change these widely felt indisgressions against his adopted Lebanese
community.
In 1969, Shi'a political and social mobilization began in earnest under the direction
of Musa al Sadr. Then President Charles Helou, after Sadr's effective campaign for a
Shi'a voice in state affairs, allowed the creation of the Higher Shi'a Islamic Council. This
was the first distinctly Shi'ite organization recognized by Lebanese state authorities. The
Charter for the Higher Shi'a Islamic reads
The Islamic Shi'a sect (taifa) is independent in its religious affairs and endowments and
institutions. It has its own sons who speak in its name according to the rules of the
Shana (Islamic Law) and to the Shi'a jurisprudence as set by the opinions of the Grand
Marjha. 63
Using the Higher Shi'a Islamic Council as a political forum, Musa al Sadr began to
disrupt the traditional power bases by demanding more for his community
60
In 1977, French family planning experts estimated that the Shi'a comprised 30% of
the total Lebanese population Maronites were the second largest sectarian group with about
25% of the population, followed by Sunnis and other Christian sects with about 20%, and
finally, Druze with 5%. As cited in Helena Cobban, "The Shi'a Community and the Future of
Lebanon, " The Muslim World Today . 2, (1985), p. 9.
"Norton, p. 17.
"Joseph Chamie as cited in Ibid, p. 163.
63Najab Jamil al Din, Al Shi'a , as cited in Ajami, p. 115-116.
83
First, he successfully led a program in the city of Tyre to cure its problem of
vagrancy. Second, as author Augustus Richard Norton notes, he devised:
the establishment of a vocational institute in the southern town of Burj al-Shimali,
which was constructed at a cost of half a million Lebanese pounds (c. $165,000 U.S.)
with monies provided by Shi'a benefactors, the Ministry of Education, and bank loans.
The institute would become an important symbol of his leadership, it is still in
operation, providing vocational training for about 500 orphans under the watchful eyes
of Musa's sister Rahab al-Sadr. 64
Finally, Musa al Sadr called for a general strike in southern Lebanon in 1970 to protest
the squalor infecting the Shi'ite community. The strike swayed President Helou to grant
an allocation of ten million dollars and a creation of a Council of the South. 65 No Shi'a
leader had ever been able to win concessions from the government on behalf of his
people. In this manner, Musa al Sadr stood alone.
His legend reached epic proportions and truly reflected its extraordinary efficacy when
his followers bestowed upon him the title of Imam. The title's significance is deeply
rooted in Shi'ism, in that only twelve Imams have been universally recognized in that faith
- beginning with the first Imam Ali and ending with the twelfth Imam, al Mahdi al
Muntazar (the Vanished Great One). 66 Musa al Sadr appeared when the Lebanese Shi'a
had almost lost its hope and faith Their first national Imam 61 had resurrected their faith
and hence he deserved preeminent recognition. Fouad Ajami writes:








millenanan expectation already read into Musa al Sadr by some of his devoted
followers... In a country of sects he had become the preeminent cleric of one of the
principal sects. 68
With Musa al Sadr, Lebanese Shi'a clearly had found their "god-sent master." 69
Even as Lebanese Shi'a bequeathed to its cleric the Imamite in fulfillment of traditions
and prophesies of the Hadith, Musa al Sadr called for a very radical political direction of
Lebanon. His thoughts were reflected in The Charter of the Amal Movement It reads
The Amal Movement believes in the citizen's complete freedom and relentlessly
combats despotism, feudalism, authoritarianism, and all forms of discrimination.
Political sectarianism in the Lebanese system prevents political development divides
citizens, and upsets national unity. For that reason, our movement rejects it and
considers it a manifestation of political backwardness in our country. 70
His rejection of the rational rule (Lebanon's confessional system of governance) of his
adopted country was nothing short of treasonous
Musa al Sadr matched words with deeds after the organization he had created, the
Higher Islamic Shi'a Council, evolved into a lame duck bureaucracy of clerics. Fouad
Ajami states:
The Cleric was without illusion about the council over which he presided He knew
and said of it that it was born amputated After all, the nineteen Shi'a members of
Parliament had cornered nineteen of the forty-three seats on the councils executive
committee. These were, on the whole, men of the old order, who knew the country
and its ways. They knew that the council could be controlled, and the their own
judgements would carry more weight than those of others. 71
68
Ibid, p. 121.
t?Max Weber, Economy and Society An Outline of Interpretive Sociology , (New
York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p.l 114.




Musa al Sadr realized that the Lebanese government, controlled by other sects and his
community, exploited by a Shi'a zu'ama, were far removed from the problems facing the
Shi'a and had become ineffectual. Therefore, he devised a new political scheme for his
community - mass popular movements - Haraket al-Mahrnmin and Haraket Amal.
Never before had such a political leader consumed Lebanese Shi'a. In March 1974,
at the founding rally of Haraket al-Mahrumin, literally meaning "Movement of the
Oppressed," more than 75,000 followers of Musa al Sadr jammed into the city of
Ba'albeck to object to their years of neglect. 72 At this rally, Sadr asked: "What does the
government expect? What does it expect except rage and except revolution?" 73 Two
months later, his presence attracted thousands again this time at a political rally in
Bekaa. 74 By July of 1975, Musa al Sadr had generated the auspices of an organization
which could support its own militia. Amal 5 (an acronym for Afwaj al Muqawamah al
Lubnaniya, or Lebanese Resistance Battalions) was born. The transformation of Haraket
al-Mahrumin into Amal had a magnificent affect upon Shi'a. Fouad Ajami stated:
Into the ranks of Amal came a wide variety of politically active Shi'a youth. Some
were assimiles formerly active in leftist and Palestinian groups; disillusioned with the
Palestinians and the left, they now wanted to belong to a movement of their own sect.
The country was giving up on universal and ideological pretensions; men were
72
Interestingly, the city of Ba'albeck had a population of about 10,000 people at the
time of this rally. An Nahar, March 18, 1974, as cited in Ajami, p. 145.
73As cited in Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam
.
(New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 58.
74An Nahar, 6 May 1974, as cited in Ajami, p. 147.
DThe Arabic word Amal translated to English means "hope."
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returning to the world of their kinsmen. 70
Truly, the charismatic leadership of Musa al Sadr had produced an authentic Shi'ite
movement and was a social force growing in political strength and effectiveness.
Up to this point, critics of the Lebanese Imam denied the extent of his achievements.
Some have claimed that "it was the multi - confessional parties and militias that attracted
the majority of Shi'a recruits, and many more Shi'as carried arms under their colors than
under the banner of Amal" 17 In any case, what the charismatic Musa al Sadr did not
accomplish in life, however, was certainly achieved after his disappearance in 1978
After a September 1978 visit to Libya to secure support for Lebanese Shi'a from Colnel
Mu'amar al Qaddafi, Imam Musa al Sadr vanished. Investigations later revealed that the
cleric's bags arrived in an airport in Rome, Italy.
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While some reports have indicated that
he is still alive today, Augustus Richard Norton states, "Most impartial observers believe
him to be dead, as do a good number of his followers when speaking about him
privately."
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8Three major theories have emerged from this mysterious event. First, some believe
that Musa al Sadr was the victim of an assassination plot ordered by Qaddafi. These people
feel that the Libyan president felt betrayed by al Sadr as Qaddafi believed that Musa had
pocketed a prior Libyan loan to the Lebanese Shi'a Others believe that Musa al Sadr was
executed by agents of the Shah of Iran's secret police - the Savak - as a response to many of
the disparaging remarks made by the Imam against the Shah. The last theory holds some
faction of the PLO responsible for Musa's disappearance. Those that adhere to this theory
believe that Musa al Sadr was executed because of his growing public opposition to
Palestinian refugees in southern Lebanon. For a more in-depth discussion of these theories




Lebanese Shi'a community 80 and his disappearance has caused a militant arousal of
Lebanese Shi'a and has thrust them into a preeminent role in the country's Civil War
especially since 1983.
At first glance Musa al Sadr's martyrdom was an unlikely choice to reach an advanced
level of paradigmatic proportionality. A cleric born in Iran and whose death was never
proven, seemingly has little chance to arouse sentiments and incite action in a Lebanese
community. Yet, his image has become extraordinarily powerful. Our model again can
be helpful in explaining the symbolic strength of his martyrdom. The first dimension -
truth perception has as much to do with the acceptance that a tyranical power is
responsible for a an individual's suffering, in this case disappearance, as it does with
verified claims of murder. Of the three theories concerning Musa al Sadr's disappearance
not one suggests that the cleric took his own life or was personally responsible for his
disappearance. All of them do, however, paint a picture of an Imam being the victim of
a plot of trickery. This is evidenced by the founding of a small group of militant
members of Amal called the Sadriyyin (the sons of Musa al Sadr). Author Robin Wright
explains:
Since his mysterious disappearance, the missing Imam had become a cause celebre
among the Shi'a, the motive for a long series of violent attacks, hijackings and
kidnappings [especially] against Libyan targets and those who did business with
Tripoli. Qaddafi had repeatedly and vehemently denied any knowledge ofImam Sadr's
whereabouts, despite his long record of antagonism toward the Lebanese figure. Three
weeks before [a] sixth hijacking, a Rome magistrate had shelved an inquiry into Imam
80
It is interesting to note that rival factions of Lebanese Shi'a have all adopted Musa al
Sadr as their organization's martyr. These include Amal, Hezbollah, and Islamic Amal. Each
organizations militia members adorn their uniforms with buttons depicting the face of their
missing Imam. Ibid, p. 55.
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Sadr's fate announcing that investigations had found that 'no crime was committed
against Sadr on Italian territory .' This decision ... prompted [infamous terrorist] Hamza
to try again. His basic demand, once again, was the release of the Imam. 'He is our
Imam,' Hamza stressed in solemn tones ... as a Catholic might talk of a cardinal, a
Tibetan Buddhist about the Dalai Lama 81
Thus, for Lebanese Shi'a, whether or not Musa al Sadr was still alive was of no
consequence. What mattered instead to them was that someone other than the cleric
himself was responsible for the Imam's capture, detention, or in the worst case death, and
that he should be found out and punished.
With regards to the second dimension - credibility - Musa al Sadr adequately fills the
requirements as described by our ideal revolutionary martyr profile. The Lebanese cleric
meets seven of the nine criteria, falling short in the areas of age and celibacy. 82 As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, however, in Islamic societies celibacy is not an
overwhelming indicator of a martyr's virtue Thus, while being generally accepted as an
ideal virtue it may not be as important to a Shi'a as it might be for a Roman Catholic
In any case, Musa al Sadr's credibility as a revolutionary martyr remains broad
It is along the last dimension - legitimate authority - that Musa al Sadr's martyrdom
stands apart from the other cases we have examined First, author Fouad Ajami notes:
Hasab [inherited merit] and nasab [genealogy] were more important than birthplace
The man who arrived in the coastal town of Tyre as its mufti (religious judge) could
trace his ancestry back to an alim from the south of Lebanon, and further back still to
the seventh Imam. The Shi'a world in Iran and Iraq and Lebanon gave Musa al Sadr
his legitimacy. The Iranian birthplace, problematic to those Sunni Arabs who asserted
the primacy of nationality over faith, did not trouble the men who followed Musa al
^Wright, p. 48.




As we established earlier in Chapter II, martyrdom is inextricably linked to the history
of Shi'ism. Shi'a (literally the partisans) have long recognized the Prophet's bloodlines
as a basis for His religious succession. When Caliph Yazid's troops killed Imam Hussein,
Shi'a were empowered by a paradigmetic martyr with a sense of righteousness, piety and
opposition.
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Hussein's death advanced the concept of shihada (martyrdom) and elevated
it to one of Shi'ism's greatest traditions of allegiance. Yet, the disappearance of the
twelfth and last Imam, Muhammed al Mahdi in 874 provided a mysticism and millenarian
expectation that His return will symbolize a rebirth at the end of time. The legitimate
authority of Musa al Sadr's martyrdom can only be determined to the extent that it
overllapped with these traditional Shi'ite beliefs.
The similarities between the prophecy of the coming Imam and Lebanese Shi'a's 7/wcr/w
Musa al Sadr are uncanny. These can be summarized as follows:
1) Muhammed proclaimed that the Imam would be a descendant of the sons of
Fatima, the Prophet's daughter. As a Sayyid, Musa al Sadr certainly fulfilled this
familial distinction.




85Jassim M. Hussain, The Occultation of the Twlefth Imam: A Historical Background
.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 17.
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Lebanese Imam's striking mediterranean complexion and towering stature fit the bill. 86
3) Muhammed prophesized that "He will come forth like a sharp, shooting star to fill
the earth with justice and equity as it was filled before with injustice and inequity." 87
Musa al Sadr's rise from the depressed Shi'ite community in Lebanon bore witness to
this revelation.
4) The seventh Imam, Musa Ibn Jafar, predicted that a cleric from Qom would lead
the believers into the path of righteousness.
88 Musa al Sadr was born in Qom and had
received some of his religious instruction in the holy Shi'ite seminaries located there.
5) The Mahdi (the hidden Imam) "will guide men to undertake a spiritual and
political transformation of society." 89 Musa al Sadr had initiated both of these societal
changes as evidenced by protest fasts, mass demonstrations, general strikes,
recognition of non Shi'a sectarian worship rituals, etc.
6) Finally, the twelfth Imam had vanished only to reappear at the end of time. The
disappearance of Musa al Sadr continues Shi'ite expectations of the coming Mahdi and
challenges them to be true to their faith
Thus, it follows that the Shi'a had more than enough substantial evidence that Musa
8bFouad Ajami describes Musa al Sadr as follows: "He cut a striking figure. His
looks - he was a very tall man - his aura, and the neatness of his clerical attire marked him as
someone different from older Shi'a clerics who now and then came into my house in Beirut,
or to my grandparents' home in a southern Lebanese village." Ajami, p. 12.






al Sadr in life reincarnation of their missing Imam 90 His disappearance could only be
considered another one of Allah's tests of their faith as Shi'a Only through his martyred
image could the continued immortalization of their Imam and their redemption be













Through analytical comparison we have thus determined that it is possible to examine
a martyr's proportional strength. Once created, a paradigmatic martyr is still dependent
upon the ability of an organization to manipulate its image using a number of differing
strategies. In the next section I will address some of these strategies which might be used
by organizations and offer an assessment of how and when they should be used during
revolutionary operations.
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In all fairness, there is one glaring prophetic attribute that Musa al Sadr did not meet
as the true Mahdi - his name did not match the Prophet's or the Prohet's grandson, Hussein.
However, the invitation to come to Lebanon was extended by Sadr's relative, Abdul Hussein
Sharif al Din which lends some credence to the last prophecy.
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E. BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS - MANIPULATING MARTYRS TO IMPROVE
THEIR EFFECTIVENESS UPON ORGANIZATIONS
Since the inception of martyrs, religious communities which have claimed these divine
images have wrestled with the symbol's power in an attempt to control its impact over an
entranced following As a highly sensational and public act,91 martyrdom initially
exposed religious minorities to authorities in power. Moreover, Mircea Eliade adds: "A
practical danger to a politically crescive minority is that some members will initiate open
political action, perhaps open rebellion, before the community is ready to support such
an act and, therefore, to succeed." 92 Religious history is replete with examples of the
derisive effects of martyrdom on communities. 93 On the other hand, a martyr's intrinsic
power to incite action is such that it gives its community an unrelenting faith and a
psychological edge against a controlling authority Thus, revolutionary organizationsover
time have recognized the need to set controls upon this symbolic image, either to
moderate or to magnify its impact upon their constituencies.
Bureaucratic controls are usually set to determine potential martyr candidates and to
91We established earlier that martyrs require audiences, actual or created (see Chapter
III). Eliade also states that "A martyr is delegated by [a] community and apotheosized by it",
Hence, no matter how well concealed, they are extremely visible symbols which expose
sentiments and ideological beliefs Eliade, "Encyclopedia,"p 234.
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Ibid, p. 235.
"During the Bar Kokhba Revolt, many Jews sought martyrdom if they were forced to
transgress any of the Ten Commandments. Thousands thus willingly gave their lives when
Hadnanic rules appeared contrary to Mosaic Law. Later on Rabbis of the period endeavored
to restrain the desire for martyrdom by Talmudic Law which denied martyrdom to any who
committed suidcide or took the life of his offspring unless he were ofrced to transgress
against the laws barring idolatry, adultery, or murder (see Chapter II), Singer, pp. 353-354,
and Ibid, p. 235.
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delineate propagation efforts of the symbol. Whatever the manner of control, the martyr
can be subsequently utilized in a militant orientation or in a more passive orientation.
Using the revolutionary martyr cases we just examined for paradigmatic proportionality,
let us now explore how their own organizations either succeeded or failed to
bureaucratically control their images and hence to determine effective strategies of
persuasion.
In the case of Bobby Sands, while some controls for candidacy were set, the
operational merit of the consequential martyrs following Sands diminished and their
deaths instead resembled a ritualistic sacrifice. It was clear early on that the IRA and its
political wing - Sinn Fein - had no effective strategy to control the Maze/Long Kesh
hunger strikers. All controls that were initiated were done so by the prisoners, especially
after the first failed strike ended in March 1981. Padraig O'Malley writes:
The nature of the offense for which a prisoner had been convicted was a major
consideration in the selection process - some were immediately ruled out because their
offenses were such that the British could use them to portray the hunger strikers as
murderous terrorists who had committed heinous crimes .... Selection for the short-list
was based on a number of other considerations: there had to be a proper geographic
spread, and volunteers who were to be released within a short time were rejected, not
because their committment to the hunger strike might be suspect, but on the grounds
that they would be more useful to the movement by reinvolving themselves in the
struggle when they got released. Volunteers who had broken under interrogation were
usually but not always ruled out... Once a volunteer was short-listed he was told to
send a comm to the Army Council [the IRA headquarters] .... He would receive a
comm back from the Army Council reiterating to him once again that ... [they] were
opposed to ... [it]. [It became obvious that] their commitment to each other [was]
superseding their oath of obedience to the IRA. 94
In the confines of an isolated prison, an IRA's effort to control the campaign had little
94rvO'Malley, p. 76.
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chance for success. But ultimately the strategy was doomed because of the prisoners
themselves. O'Malley finally concludes that:
there was no strategy - no clearly defined plan of how to proceed, no contingency
arrangements, no back-up cover. There was no agreement as to how long the hunger
strike should last or how many should be allowed to die. Sands himself, we are told
by some, wanted no one other than himself to die or at least there to be no escalation
beyond the initial cluster of four. 95
The Maze/Long Kesh hunger strike was thus doomed as soon as Sands perished. After
the death of the tenth striker, families of the remaining hunger strikers were so moved by
their own moral convictions that they interceded and requested that British prison officials
force feed their sons Therefore, the subsequent efforts to hallow and immortalize Bobby
Sands and his nine followers were at once undermined, their potentiality for later use
debilitated to the point that their names are a mere flash in the long memory of Northern
Irish Catholics.
In the case of Jose Rizal, Bonifacio and the Katipunan revolutionaries did not attempt
to "operationalize" the revolutionary martyr's image To have done so would have
immediately placed them on weak footing This is especially so because while alive Rizal
was critical of the Katipunan 's overzealous behavior In 1896 Rizal wrote:
From the very beginning, when I first received information of what was being planned,
I opposed it, fought against it, and I made it clear that it was absolutely impossible ...
I was convinced that the very idea was wholly absurd .... Thoroughly imbued with
these ideas, I cannot do less than condemn, as I do condemn, this ridiculous and
barbarous uprising, plotted behind my back, which both dishonors Filipinos and
discredits those who might have taken our part96 .




-As cited in Zafra, p. 144
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passive strategies to manipulate Rizal's martyrdom and in this manner they were very
successful.
Author Nicholas Zafra notes:
his name was used as a password in the initiation ceremonies of the Katipunan, and
his picture was displayed in Katipunan circles as the liberator of the Filipino race.
Andres Bonifacio himself, the founder of the Katipunan, had a good collection of
documents relating to Rizal which he kept in his archives in the warehouse he worked
as a bodeguero (wine cellar foreman). 97
Potentially a robust militant and political symbol, Rizal's image was therefore manipulated
to bolster recruitment and to propagate the concept of Filipino nationalism and
independence. Initially firmly controlled by Bonifacio and others, Rizal's image
succeeded in accomplishing these goals.
In our last case of revolutionary martyrdom, we find the most complete and thorough
levels of bureaucratic control over the symbol. Shi'ite revolutionary groups attempted to
control both the candidacy of their consequential martyrs, as well as manipulate the
propagation of Musa al Sadr's image. During their "operationalization" of al Sadr's image,
Amal and Hezbollah set the following guidelines for their revolutionaries aspiring to
follow in the Imam's shadow of Shi'ite martyrdom. First, all potential candidates had to
be male. Second, they had to be old enough to have been deemed responsible for their
actions, yet still unmarried. Third, they had to have no ties to anyone who might seek
out the organization in order to avenge their deaths. Thus, orphans made prime
candidates. Finally, they ensured that the individuals were truly motivated by their piety
Ibid, p. 142.
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toward Allah and were not insane. 98
The selection process enabled both groups to wield considerable operational strength
against their deemed enemies," as witnessed by the numerous instances of Shi'ite violence
in Lebanon during the early to mid - 1980s. One such operation yielded horrific results.
On 1 1 November 1982, 60 Israeli soldiers as well as 14 others died in an explosion which
devastated a building in Tyre, Lebanon - Musa al Sadr's adopted community. Reports
surfaced that the explosion was caused by a fifteen year old Shi'a youth named Ahmad
Qusayr that drove an explosive filled truck into the building and detonated it when the
truck crashed.
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Subsequently, Qusayr's photograph has adorned the streets in southern
Lebanon. However, by 1986 these "suicide missions" had devolved into a disastrous
operational campaign Author Martin Kramer notes: "As purer ... martyrs were offered
for fewer immediate results, the measure of sacred war in the operations diminished, and
that of sacrifice increased." 10 ' Although resembling the IRA's failed operational strategy
in steadily increasing losses, the Shi'a were able to regain control of these martyring
operations.
Shi'ite clerics, recognizing that the violence was becoming increasingly harmful to
their communities in southern Lebanon, actively sought out the revolutionary leadership
98Kramer, pp. 38-41.
"Kramer reports that Hezbollah targeted American, French, and Israeli forces in







in Hezbollah and Amal to change their strategies. At first, the clerics bargained for the
adoption of a strategy to promote subsequent martyrdom only when a ratio of ten deaths
for every sacrifice could be guaranteed. 102 When this still produced little in the way of
a positive effect, the clerics urged the groups to abolish their "action" strategies. Martin
Kramer writes:
The Shi'ite clerics understood, as [Rene] Girard [does] that 'the sacrificial act appears
both sinful and saintly, an illegal as well as a legitimate exercise of violence.' And
when it appeared more sinful than saintly, it had to be banned. 103
Thus, a conditional ban on the action strategy of propagating consequential martyrdom
was agreed upon by all Shi'a, most importantly the revolutionary leadership. Currently
it now appears that this ban has caused Musa al Sadr's image to be used in other
"passive" strategies.
To honor their national Imam, Shi'a have recently reverted to what Fouad Ajami has
labelled "ritual repentance."
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During marches recognizing the anniversary of his
disappearance, young Shi'a men are more apt to carry posters bearing the portrait of their
Imam than to carry guns or explosives. Musa al Sadr's visage has become the Shi'ite
community's identification badge and his memory has been transformed into one of hope,






104 Ajami, p. 207.
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F. SUMMARY
Throughout the course of this chapter I have attempted to show that revolutionary
martyrs are not inherently equal in symbolic stature. Each revolutionary martyr must be
judged upon its social acceptability and its effect upon its audience. First, their
acceptability is dependent upon the construction of three social dimensions which help
to contribute to a broadened paradigmatic proportionality. Next, organizational strategies
in the form of bureaucratic controls help determine the martyr's impact upon a social
group. To the extent that martyr images can be manipulated to follow the confines of
socially constructed paradigms and to adhere to strategies by organizations waging
revolution will decide the symbol's ultimate strength
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V. CONCLUSION
This study began by asserting that martyrs, more than any other symbol in history,
have long been a tool of mass persuasion. Aside from the sensational aura that
accompanies them, martyrs have been effective because of their associated, represented
character. Chapter II analyzed how the associated character of martyrs has evolved
throughout history from one of passive asceticism to one of political militancy. This
evolution of the martyr's character logically places it as a preeminent symbol in the recent
emergence of revolutions where political violence has become injected into social
environments throughout the globe. Chapter III described the phenomenon of symbol
formation within revolutionary environments, particularly the adoption of heroes, patriots,
and martyrs by organizations contending for social and political power. It also explained
why martyrs, rather than the latter two figures, are inherently more powerful as individual
symbols. Further, we dissected the creation of revolutionary martyrs and showed that
they remain as phenomenological social constructs. Their creation is also dependent upon
both necessary and sufficient conditions found within their societies. To the extent that
these conditions are met, we can predict whether or not revolutionary organizations will
adopt or reject martyrs as symbols of persuasion. Chapter IV affirmed that martyrs can
never be tarred, so to speak, with the same brush. We can not universally dismiss them
as failures, nor can we can hold them universally in awe. Thus, I offered a model of
paradigmatic proportionality to judge the acceptability of a martyr's image within its
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society and I offered an explanation as to how bureaucratic controls may be utilized in
manipulating this image from action-oriented strategies to more passive strategies.
Most comparativists that have written about revolution focus on variables which they
can empirically measure. They do so in order to numerically or categorically add strength
to their argument. This study has certainly not followed their lead. But it is still
nonetheless important and valid to an academic community searching for definitive
answers to otherwise intangible questions. One such enduring question is why individuals
join revolutionary movements when they have no logical reason to believe that their
membership in such an organization will definitively turn the tide to victory. It was noted
American writer, William Sydney Porter - known also by his pseudonym O'Henry - who
stated, "Perhaps there is no happiness in life so perfect as the martyr's." Thus, martyrs
as political symbols imbued by an acceptance of a millenanan expectation might indeed
offer a valid explanation to this frequently addressed question.
There can also be no doubt that the martyr image has figured prominently in
revolutionary movements since the end of the eighteenth century. Recent revolutionary
movements, including those which stress the adherence of Marxist/Leninist principles of
materialism over idealism, validate this premise. From the Nazi pantheon of fallen
saviors to Latin American theological liberationists one thing is certain. Martyrs are here
to stay. Even an atrocity such as the mass murder of innocent, worshipping Palestinians
in an Islamic mosque in Hebron, however juxtaposed to our rational judgement, has just
produced one such exemplar for Rabbi Kahane adherents, members of Kach. Thus, we
can not continue to ignore martyrs and their impact upon contending social groups. To
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do so would be certainly foolhardy for academics and potentially devastating to those who
risk their lives against such rebellious groups and their semi-loyal communities.
Through a proper understanding of the martyr in revolution we can more appropriately
devise strategies to either undermine its power after its adoption or negate its creation.
In the latter case one can certainly avoid the foundational auspices for the creation of
martyrs. One such way to do so would be to incorporate certain controls designed to
quell those necessary and sufficient conditions of martyrdom. For example, it has been
thus far fruitful for President Fujimori in Peru, who in spite of his threats to kill
revolutionary leader Abimael Guzman, to avoid creating a paradigmatic martyr for
Sendero Luminoso. By now many believe Fujimori realizes that by executing the
captured Maoist guerrilla leader, he would create a personified object of rivalry and in
time possibly tip the scales in favor of the insurgents. Can other controls be
implemented? Certainly this is one such topic which may be worthy of additional study.
Attention must also be given to the former case for it too may directly impact upon
a martyr's relative strength. Clearly we can point to those dimensions where a
revolutionary martyr falls short in the paradigmatic proportionality model. If an authority
can publicize and hence establish some reason to doubt either the hallowed image of the
martyr or his relationship to his communal group then his substantive persuasive impact
can be lessened. Also, those strategies - action oriented or passive - embraced by
revolutionary organizations can be utilized against them It has been known for quite a
long time that the funeral processions so popular in the honoring of IRA martyrs have
been a venue for the British authorities to identify revolutionaries in attendance.
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A martyr's power must also be seen in light of our own offensive psychological
warfare strategies and in this manner we must understand how the image can be used
toward what we deem as positive ends. Thomas Jefferson stated that: "Politics, like
religion, hold[s] up the torches of martyrdom to the reformers of error." America has
long lived up to the notion that we are a redeemer nation, whose destiny it is to create
a world where individual liberties are not transgressed upon Our sponsoring of particular
"freedom fighters" around the world gives us a semblance of a test bed to either prove
or disprove many of the arguments presented in this thesis.
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APPENDIX A




ROBERT "BOBBY" SANDS MICHAEL COLLINS
AUGUSTO "CESAR" SANDINO
JOSE MARTI JOSE RIZAL
COMMUNIST
ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA HANS BEIMLER
FASCIST
JOSE ANTONIO PRIMO DE RIVERA - Falangist
REINHARD HEYDRICH - Nazi
ALBERT LEO SCHLAGETER - Nazi
HORST WESSEL - Nazi








EMILIANO ZAPATA HUNG HSIU-CHUAN
ANTI-MONARCHIST
JEAN PAUL MARAT - Sansculotte
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tin Hale U 21 Yes Student No Yes UnM : Unk Advanced
Paul Marat U 50 No Doctor/Journalist Yes Yes No link Advanced
n Hsiu-
ii
M 50 No Teacher/
Mystic
Yes Yes Unk Unk Failed
matriculation
u.Viarti M 42 No Lawyer/Writer Yes Yes No Yes Advanced
Rizai M 35 Yes Doctor/Lawyer Yes Yes Yes Yes Advanced
lano Zapata M 39 Yes Horse Groomer Yes Yes Unk Unk Self Taught
tael Collins M 32 No Postal Worker Yes Yes UnM Unk Secondary
it Leo
igeter
M 29 Yes Businessman Yes No UnM Yes Began
Advanced
Degree
t Wessel M 22 No SA Officer/
Songwriter
Yes Yes No Unk Gymnasium
lert Norkus U 15 No Student No No UnM Yes Secondary
.is to
ar" Sandino
M 38 Yes Miner/Salesman Yes Yes No Yes Secondary
Antonio
o de Rivera
U 33 Yes Politiclan/Wnter Yes Yes Unk Yes Advanced
laventura
uti
M 40 No Metal
Worker/Bank
Robber
Yes Yes No Unk Secondary
> Beimler M 40 No Laborer/Unionisty
Political Officer
No Yes Unk Unk Secondary
Guzman
cardo
U 24 Yes Army Officer No No UnM No Advanced
hard
irich
M 38 No SS Obergruppen-
fuhrer
Yes No No No Advanced
ilo Torres M 37 No Priest No Yes Yes Yes Advanced
»to "Che"
vara
M 39 Yes Doctor Yes Yes No Yes Advanced
a al Sadr M 50 Unk Cleric Yes Yes No Unk Advanced
ert "Bobby"
Is
M 27 Yes Coach Builder
/MP/Wnter
Yes Yes No Yes Secondary
r'» notes 1) Names arranged chronologically. 2) All martyrs were killed, however, those with a positive response were executed by an agent acting under orders
an authority in power. 3) Leadership skills are based upon the hierarchial level martyr attained within an organization. 4) Refers to whether martyr was noted
is oratorical or literary skills, 5) Celibacy is understandably difficult to prove. Therefore. I allowed for four categories of responses - Yes, No, Unmarried -
esting that there may be a likelihood that he was celibatefUnM ). and Unknown (Unk), 6) Determined by some form of documentation regarding the martyr's
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